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Abstract 
The aim of this project is to determine how the CDM can be utilised in energy planning in non-
Annex 1 countries in order to achieve the development goals set by the government. The report 
considers the Energy Efficiency Strategy in South Africa as a case study.  
 
The findings of the report indicate that the CDM can be applied in the Energy Efficiency Strategy 
by using it to fund pilot projects through a CDM Pilot Project Scheme. These pilot projects should 
be selected using a bidding process administered by the Promotions sub-committee under the DNA. 
The bidding process would be based on the targets set for the third phase of the Energy Efficiency 
Strategy in order to ensure additionality as well as replication of the project in the medium-term. 
Once selected the projects would fall under Eskom’s DSM Programme and would be eligible for 
financial assistance from the state utility’s DSM Fund.  
 
The CDM Pilot Project Scheme would also include a South African Carbon Fund. This would be 
used to consolidate the CERs produced by CDM activities in the country in order to demand a 
better price from foreign buyers by reducing the risk involved for purchasers of CERs through the 
fund as well as reducing transaction costs for CDM activities in the country. Foreign and local 
investors would be allowed to invest in the Carbon Fund, which in turn could invest in CDM 
activities in South Africa.  
 
The aim of the CDM Pilot Project Scheme is to allow the government to utilise the experiences 
gained from the CDM activities in the development of future energy policy and in this way move 
South Africa onto a more sustainable development path. This is reliant on the government being 
willing to take the necessary political steps required to achieve this and show more innovative 
thinking in its development policy as well as utilising Eskom for more public benefit projects.  
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Introduction 
The ratification and subsequent entry into force earlier this year of the Kyoto Protocol provides 
developing countries with the opportunity to attract investment in greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement 
projects through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). It is hoped that the CDM will provide 
the financial incentive for investments in low-emission technologies in developing countries, which 
in turn will reduce global GHG emissions and assist non-Annex 1 countries move towards a more 
sustainable future. How and to what extent this will occur is still uncertain as there is no precedence 
to use as a guideline, however, a few trends can be identified.  
 
The first trend is in the price of carbon credits. Initially it was expected that the global carbon 
market would be characterised by low prices and strong competition between the flexible 
mechanisms as there would be a lower demand for emission credits than originally anticipated due 
to the absence of the USA from the Kyoto Protocol and the increased allowance for sinks 
(Michaelowa, 2003: 202). This does not appear to be the case however, as GHG emissions from 
Annex 1 countries have generally increased steadily since the Kyoto Protocol was first derived in 
1997. If one considers the trends in European carbon trading the price for a tonne of CO2 equivalent 
has been as high as 28 Euros1. It is unlikely that this high price will continue into the first 
commitment period as more and more cheaper credits from CDM, JI and emissions trading enter 
into the equation as the market matures, but it does appear that prices will be slightly higher than 
expected before the European trading initiative came into being. Currently Annex 1 countries are 
looking to buy 490 million tonnes of Carbon Emission Reductions (CER)2 to reach their reduction 
targets (MEWC, 2005: 5). At an average price of $5 per tonne this is the equivalent of $2 billion 
committed to the purchase of CERs over the next seven years. It is, of course, in the interest of non-
Annex 1 countries to maximise benefits from these investments, but the question is how best to do 
this considering the limited finances available?  
 
Another trend in CDM is the manner in which most project-based transactions have occurred. 
Initially it was expected that Annex 1 countries would be active in investing directly in CDM 
projects, but to date most of the risk is placed on the project developer, as CERs are purchased as a 
commodity after being produced. Only a few transactions have occurred where the purchaser of 
                                                 
1 Closing price on the 5th of July 2005 was €28.78 per European Union Allowance (per ton of carbon)  
2 A CER is equal to one tonne of carbon. 
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CERs invests either equity or debt in the project and gets the emission reductions as part of its 
returns (Lecocq, 2004: 25). If this trend continues it could be assumed that most CDM projects will 
be financed by investors based in the host country, by holding companies or by carbon funds with 
the CERs being sold as a commodity. This is an indication that CDM should not be viewed as a 
financing mechanism for projects, but rather as a potential source of income. Non-Annex 1 
governments should be aware that if this trend continues most CDM projects would be carried out 
by private investors and not as originally envisaged as a partnership between governments or 
between local and foreign industries. In order for non-Annex 1 governments to extract maximum 
benefits from the CDM it may be beneficial to integrate the CDM into the energy-planning 
framework. This will not only give direction to the process, but also provide an indicator to project 
developers of which types of projects government prioritises. The integration of CDM into the 
planning framework will make this process more transparent and ensure that CDM activities are 
focused on achieving definite development goals defined in government policy documents.  
 
There has also been a trend in non-Annex 1 countries to cite the CDM for not taking the initiative to 
improve energy efficiency and introduce renewable energy. The non-Annex 1 countries fear that 
they will reduce their competitiveness in attracting CDM projects if they implement new 
environmental regulations. It appears that developing countries sometimes use the CDM as a means 
of passing the responsibility for improving their environmental on to Annex 1 countries citing the 
CDM. This is due to the requirement that emission reductions have to be additional to any that 
would have occurred in the absence of the project activity before the CDM Executive Board (EB) 
can issue CERs.    
 
Problem statement 
Energy planning in South Africa is still in its infancy. The Department of Minerals and Energy 
(DME) published the first Integrated Energy Plan (IEP) for the country in 2004. The document is 
considered unambitious and a disappointment by some stakeholders in the energy sector due to the 
exclusion of renewable energy and environmental externalities from the plan. It is nonetheless a 
sign of intent from the DME that future energy planning will consider a much wider range of issues 
than has previously been the case in South Africa. The DME has already announced that a new IEP 
will be published in 2006, which will include action plans for the implementation of renewable 
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energy in South Africa as well as increased energy efficiency. This is in accordance with the 
government’s stated goal of utilising an additional 10,000 GWh renewable energy contribution to 
final energy consumption by 2013 and to reduce final electricity demand by 12% in 2014. The 
CDM is one of the instruments available to the South African government that can play a role in 
achieving these targets. It may, therefore, be advantageous to include CDM in the planning process.  
 
Despite this possibility the government in South Africa, and in many other non-Annex 1 countries, 
appear to be citing the CDM as a reason not to regulate on initiatives regarding the introduction and 
expansion of renewable energy and energy efficiency. Concerns have been raised that rather than 
furthering development in non-Annex 1 countries the CDM is in fact a hindrance for the passing of 
new environmental regulations in developing countries as the non-Annex 1 nations fear reducing 
their competitiveness in attracting CDM project developers. The reasoning behind this is the 
question of additionality. All CDM projects must produce reductions in emissions that are 
additional to any that would have occurred in the absence of the CDM project activity. This 
requirement may hinder the inclusion of the CDM into planning as this may render the projects non-
additional.  
 
The aim of this thesis will be to investigate how the CDM can be integrated into energy planning 
without compromising the additionality of CDM projects and at the same time create an enabling 
environment for project developers. This leads to the overall research question in this report: 
 
 
 
How can the CDM be integrated into energy planning in South Africa in order to assist 
government achieve its policy targets for energy efficiency? 
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Methodology 
This chapter will describe the methodology used to answer the research question as well as 
elaborating on the demarcations made in this project and the choice of subject matter. 
 
Research field 
The overall research field in this project is the South African electricity sector. In order to create a 
functional view of the research field the electricity sector will be represented as a system, which 
allows for connections between various factors to be identified and a coherent picture of the effects 
of a planning decision to be formed. This helps create a holistic view of the problem statement and 
the environment in which it occurs as well as maintaining the context in which the problem exists. 
 
The central challenges facing the electricity sector in South Africa are security of supply, reduction 
of fuel poverty and international competitiveness. The interplay between these elements and the 
framework in which they occur are illustrated in figure 2.1 below. This represents the system that 
forms the overall research field in this project.  
 
 
y
reduction of fuel 
poverty 
 
 
 international 
climate regime  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The system representing the re
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acity, for example, will ensure security of supply but may also 
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lead to increases in tariffs that would negatively affect the poor but may lead to increased efficiency 
in industry, whilst artificially low prices for end-consumers could negatively influence the utility’s 
ability to ensure security of supply through new investments. The interplay between the three 
elements forming the triangle does not, however, occur in a vacuum. The frame around the triangle 
represents the environment in which the electricity system in South Africa occurs and the external 
factors that the electricity system is affected by. 
 
The South African electricity sector is currently in a period of flux, moving from a state-owned 
vertical monopoly with excess capacity and cheap electricity towards an open electricity market 
with new capacity requirements and increasing electricity prices. In order to meet the central 
challenges of supply security, fuel poverty and international competitiveness in this changing 
climate, policy makers must take steps to maintain a balance between these issues.  
 
Demarcation of research field 
Having introduced the system and the greater context in which the project will take place, this 
section will narrow the focus of the project in order that the problem statement can be properly 
answered.  
 
Selection of energy efficiency 
The CDM is an opportunity for South Africa to benefit from investments in technologies that lead 
to the abatement of GHGs through the sale of CERs to Annex 1 countries. This is especially so as 
the electricity industry in South Africa is very CO2 intensive due to the predominance of coal-fired 
power stations in the electricity mix, which means that the CO2 abatement involved in reducing 
electricity use with 1 kWh is higher than in most other countries. At the same time South Africa is 
facing a situation whereby increases in electricity consumption is putting strain on the existing 
generating capacity, which will require new investment in the near future to maintain reliable 
service for all customers if no action is taken to reduce demand. This poses a problem for 
government, as the new investments will inevitably lead to price increases in the short to medium 
term, which will negatively impact on low-income consumers as well as industry’s international 
competitiveness.  
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In order to address this issue the South African government has introduced an EE policy with the 
aim of delaying investments in new generating technology. This policy recognises that the CDM 
can play a role in increasing EE but does not identify how this can be done and where the 
mechanism can be used effectively.   
 
EE provides the South African government with the cheapest and quickest option for responding to 
the problem of electricity consumption outstripping supply in the short to medium term, thereby 
buying time for the sector to make new investments in appropriate generating technologies. A more 
efficient electricity system also provides better opportunities for investing in RE generating capacity 
such as wind turbines and solar power as it provides a more stable demand pattern with reduced 
peaks and troughs. At present the very low price of electricity excludes renewables from being 
competitive on the electricity market and it is unlikely that the CDM will provide enough additional 
revenue to make RE economically viable in the short to medium term (Worthington, 23/12/2004 & 
Schäffler, 16/12/2004). Even though the government produced a white paper on RE in 2002 little 
progress has been made on the issue. Reasons for this are that government can only afford to 
provide a total of R 14 million in subsidies for the advancement of RE in South Africa (Nassiep, 
11/11/2004), the fact that coal is, and will remain, the fuel of choice for electricity production in 
South Africa as it is cheap, produced locally and can best address the three elemental challenges 
facing the electricity system (Nassiep 4/11/2004) and the fact that RE is not a priority considering 
the social and economic problems the country faces.  
 
Due to the availability of cheap domestic coal for electricity production the focus for RE should, in 
the short to medium-term, be on the transport sector in the form of bio diesels and other renewable 
liquid fuels, as this will reduce expenditure on oil imports. The high oil price at present makes this 
option more economically attractive and combined with the fact that from a balance of payments 
perspective, oil is the single biggest cash outflow item in the South African economy. South Africa 
has had a synthetic fuel programme since the 1950’ies and this expertise could be utilised to 
develop renewable liquid fuels. As the research field for this project is the electricity sector in South 
Africa the project will limit its scope to EE and how the CDM can be introduced into planning for 
the EE strategy. This initiative has been actively promoted by the government since May 2005 and 
provides great scope for environmental improvement whilst still maintaining the balance between 
the three main priorities of the South African electricity sector. 
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Focus on the electricity chain 
In an electricity system there is a chain of technological links through which primary energy is 
converted into electricity services e.g. lighting, space heating etc. The technologies used in this 
chain can be divided into two categories, technology for supplying electricity and end-use 
technology. The supply-side category can further be divided into two sub-categories, conversion 
which involves the production of electricity from a primary fuel source and distribution, which is 
the delivery of electricity to the end-user. This is illustrated in figure 2.2 below. 
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Figure 2.2: Simplified illustration of the electricity chain  
 
Generally efficiency is lowest in an energy system closest to the final consumer of 
(Meyer & Nørgaard, 1989: 790), which usually provides greater scope for electricit
use. Savings in final consumption are also magnified due to the gradual build up of
the system depending on the efficiency in the conversion and distribution stages in 
Another reason for concentrating on efficiency improvements in the end-user stage
can be implemented far more rapidly than in the other stages of the electricity chain
to the focus of this project being on EE initiatives in the end-use stage of the electri
 
The role of CDM 
The CDM is a project-based mechanism that is intended to assist Annex 1 countrie
emission reduction targets as well as help non-Annex 1 countries move towards sus
development. The CDM has the potential to assist non-Annex 1 countries but there
little consideration of how the mechanism can be utilised by host nations in the plan
order to promote sustainable development. This project will investigate how a non-
can take the initiative in utilising the CDM to effect changes in energy planning tha
country move towards a more sustainable development. The Energy Efficiency Stra
Africa will be used as an example of how this can be achieved. 
 Commercialrgy source Conversio Distribution         End-useDomestic 
the electricity 
y savings at end-
 loses throughout 
the system. 
 is that changes 
. This will lead 
city chain.  
s achieve their 
tainable 
 has been very 
ning process in 
Annex 1 country 
t help the 
tegy in South 
14
 Definitions 
As this project potentially has a very wide scope it is necessary to introduce delimitations for the 
study so as to maintain focus and allow for a clear and precise answer to the research problem.  
 
Energy planning – The term energy planning in this project will specifically refer to electricity and 
its production, transmission and distribution.  
 
Energy efficiency – The term energy efficiency (EE) will refer to a reduction in electricity 
consumption. 
  
The Kyoto Protocol and the CDM –. It is not within the scope of this project to discuss the merits 
and faults of the CDM or the Kyoto Protocol. Now that the Kyoto Protocol has been ratified by 
Russia and has been effective since the 16th of February 2005 this is the framework in which global 
GHG reductions will occur until the first commitment period finishes in 2012.  
 
CDM activities - It is not the intention of this thesis to identify specific projects that may be 
suitable for CDM, but rather to indicate in which way CDM can be used to further development in 
certain sectors. The identification of projects is the responsibility of project developers, whilst this 
project intends to determine how the CDM can be used in planning. 
 
Project strategy 
This subsection will describe how this project will be built up in order to answer the problem 
statement. As indicated in figure 2.3 below the project can be broken down into four steps. The first 
step is intended to define what the study objective of this project is by introducing the problem 
statement, describing the context in which the problem statement occurs and demarcating the 
research field in which the problem statement will be considered. The second step considers the 
status quo of the demarcated research field in South Africa at present. The intention of these 
chapters is to provide the empirical data required to consider the problem statement in an informed 
and unbiased way and will supply the necessary information to analyse the barriers and 
opportunities inherent in the problem statement. The third step is an analysis of the barriers and 
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opportunities for applying the problem statement and a potential solution to it. The final step 
concludes the project by discussing the implications of the problem statement and whether it can be 
applied in practice.  
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Table 2.1: Project design 
Chapter Working questions Answer approach  Empirical data Expected result 
3. CDM in the 
South African 
context 
 
- What are the origins 
of the CDM? 
- What are the aims of 
the CDM and what role 
do the institutions of 
the CDM play in 
achieving them? 
-The CDM project 
cycle 
-The CDM in South 
Africa, the DNA and 
who should move on 
CDM in SA 
Description of 
institutions and 
modalities of the 
CDM and how they 
are supposed to 
function to achieve 
the aims of the 
CDM 
Short description of 
CDM in SA, the 
DNA and potential 
movers for 
implementation 
UNFCCC and 
Executive Board 
homepage,  
Interviews,  
DNA workshop, 
independent 
literature 
Overview of how 
the CDM functions 
in theory and in 
practise. 
Identification of 
trends within the 
CDM and an 
overview of the 
CDM in SA 
4. The South 
African 
electricity 
system 
-What is the current 
situation of the 
electricity sector?  
- How will the 
electricity sector 
development in the 
future? 
-Who are the major 
stakeholders and what 
are their interests? 
 
 
Description of the 
electricity sector in 
SA and how it is 
expected to 
develop in the 
future as well as 
stakeholder 
analysis 
 
 
 
Integrated resource 
plan, national 
integrated resource 
plan, Eskom’s 
strategy, capacity 
requirements and 
demand, statistics, 
interviews and 
government 
policies  
 
Overview of 
electricity sector in 
SA and expected 
developments in 
the sector. 
Understanding of 
stakeholders role 
and interests  
5. Energy 
efficiency in 
South Africa 
 
-What is the 
government’s policy for 
EE? 
-How is Eskom 
addressing EE? 
-What type of 
regulation is being 
used to implement EE? 
Description of the 
EE strategy, 
Eskom’s DSM 
programme and 
NER’s regulation 
for DSM as well as 
government’s plans 
for EE regulation 
EE strategy, 
Independent 
literature, 
Information from 
Eskom and the 
NER, interviews 
 
 
Conclusion where 
EE policy is 
discussed, where 
problems for 
implementation lie 
and status of 
implementation so 
far 
6. Barriers for 
integrating 
CDM into 
planning  
What are the barriers 
for integrating CDM 
into EE strategy in 
South Africa? 
What can be done 
about them? 
A study of where 
barriers exist for 
CDM in regulation, 
planning and 
understanding of 
CDM 
From status 
chapters  
Discussion on what 
the major 
stumbling blocks 
for integration of 
the CDM may be. 
Possible solutions 
to these barriers 
7. Integration 
of CDM into 
planning 
- Where can the CDM 
play a role in EE 
strategy in SA? 
-Identification of 
potential areas where 
CDM can be utilised 
An examination of 
the possibilities 
and restrictions 
CDM offers EE in 
SA 
From status 
chapters 
Discussion on how 
CDM can be used 
in planning and 
where it can be 
implemented 
8.Conclusion - Return to the 
research question  
Summarise the 
results of the 
project 
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CDM in the South African context  
This chapter will give an understanding of how the international climate regime affects the South 
African electricity system and the role it plays in the research field as described in the methodology. 
The CDM is one of the external factors influencing the electricity system in South Africa at present 
and it is considered an opportunity for the country to introduce improvements without negatively 
affecting the three core concerns of government, reduction of fuel poverty, security of supply and 
maintaining international competitiveness for industry through cheap electricity prices.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the CDM in general and a better understanding 
of the issues and developments that have shaped the CDM since its inception in 1997 in order to 
identify the opportunities and limitations inherent in the mechanism when integrating it into the 
energy planning framework in South Africa. This will be achieved by firstly providing a short 
historical outline of how the CDM became an integral part of the Kyoto Protocol, which will give 
an understanding of how the concept of a flexible mechanism involving Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 
countries was established despite opposition from both the E.U. and many developing countries. 
Insight into how the CDM came to be will assist in understanding why the modalities and 
institutions of the CDM exist in their current form.  
 
The next section of this chapter will consist of a description of the aims of the CDM and how these 
are to be achieved using the framework for the mechanism agreed on in the Marrakech Accord. 
This will include a description of the CDM project cycle, the institutions of the CDM, their role in 
providing an enabling environment for the promotion of CDM project activities both locally and 
internationally and a discussion on how these institutions can influence the CDM process and the 
external pressures that influence them. The final section of this chapter will take a closer look at the 
CDM in South Africa and on the progress made in the administration of the CDM in order that the 
possibilities for integrating the CDM in energy planning can be identified at a later stage in the 
project. 
 
The Origins and Aims of the CDM 
The CDM is one of the three flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol that have their origin in a 
proposal from Norway and the Netherlands in negotiations for the FCCC. The flexible mechanisms 
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are intended to assist countries with high marginal abatement costs to buy emission reductions in 
countries with lower marginal abatement costs as a means to reduce GHG emissions and achieve 
emission targets. The concept of countries collaborating in order to achieve emission targets was 
heavily backed by the U.S. at the Earth Summit and was included in Article 4.2 of the FCCC. The 
following section will discuss how the CDM developed from this initial proposal into the 
mechanism that exists today under the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
The Origins of the CDM 
In preparatory negotiations for COP 1 the parties were unable to agree on criteria for a mechanism 
that would allow Annex 1 countries to generate carbon credits through projects in another country. 
The E.U. and the developing countries opposed this for different reasons. The E.U. preferred an 
approach of harmonised policies and measures, whilst developing countries feared that joint 
implementation would allow Annex 1 countries to maintain their GHG-intensive economies whilst 
buying emission reductions in non-Annex 1 countries at lower prices. Non-Annex 1 countries were 
concerned that this would lead to cheap abatement projects being snapped up by Annex 1 countries 
leaving only expensive alternatives for domestic action in developing countries and that this could 
result in the price difference in production costs between developed and developing countries being 
reduced. Non-Annex 1 countries were also anxious that GHG abatement projects in developing 
countries would redirect official development aid in order to fund Annex 1 countries’ efforts to 
comply with emission targets. This stalemate resulted in a compromise being reached at COP 1, 
which defined a pilot phase for projects referred to as Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ). These 
AIJ projects would not, however, result in emission credits.  
 
At COP 3 in Kyoto the Americans proposed that flexible mechanisms should be allowed in the 
form of emissions trading between Annex 1 countries and through project implementation between 
Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries. The U.S. proposal included two criteria for projects in non-
Annex 1 countries. These were that projects should be compatible and supportive of national 
environmental and development goals and that they should provide emission reductions additional 
to any that otherwise would have occurred (Matsuo, 2003:5). This proposal was rejected strongly by 
both developing countries and the E.U.  
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Brazil put forward a proposal at COP 3 referred to as the Clean Development Fund (CDF), which 
included financial penalties of $10 per tonne CO2 for non-compliance with emission targets, a 
portion of which would be ear-marked for mitigation projects in non-Annex 1 countries. Behind the 
scenes negotiations between Brazil and the U.S. resulted in an amalgamation of the U.S. proposal 
and the Brazilian CDF into the CDM. Financial penalties for non-compliance were dropped and 
instead Annex 1 countries would be permitted to spend money on implementing abatement projects 
in non-Annex 1 countries, which would result in the creation of emission credits. The goals of the 
proposed CDM were to assist non-Annex 1 countries in achieving sustainable development whilst 
contributing to the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC and helping Annex 1 countries achieve their 
emission reduction commitments. The E.U. had, however, made it clear in negotiations that it 
would not accept any emission credits from countries that did not have a reduction commitment.  
 
As fate would have it the E.U. negotiators had retreated for internal consultations when the 
chairman of COP 3 called the joint Brazilian and American proposal for article 12 on the final night 
of negotiations. When the Europeans returned to the plenary they discovered that the CDM had 
been accepted and announced their opposition and tried to reopen the debate but to no avail 
(Michaelowa, 2004: 33). The CDM was the surprise package of the Kyoto Protocol and provided 
not only Annex 1 countries with the opportunity to reduce abatement costs, but also provided a 
formal link between the Kyoto Protocol and developing countries. The support of the non-Annex 1 
countries for the CDM was achieved by establishing sustainable development as a dual objective 
and the fact that it originated from a Brazilian proposal, which gave the developing countries a 
sense of ownership of the idea (La Rovere & Thorne, 1999: 4).    
 
Even though the CDM had been written into the Kyoto Protocol it would take four years of 
negotiations before it was agreed how the mechanism should function. Initially the E.U. was 
determined to limit the use of the CDM and other flexible mechanisms, but found little support for 
this except amongst NGO’s. The collapse of negotiations in The Hague, which was widely 
attributed to the French and German environmental ministers scuppering a deal with the U.S. 
negotiated by the U.K., and the subsequent withdrawal of the U.S. from the Kyoto Protocol forced 
the E.U. to accept the market mechanisms or risk the total collapse of international efforts for 
controlling GHG emissions. This resulted in the adoption of the procedures and modalities for the 
 20
CDM at COP 7, the rules and procedures of the CDM Executive Board at COP 8 and definitions 
and modalities for including afforestation and reforestation activities at COP 9.  
 
It is hoped that the CDM will stimulate international investment in developing countries and 
provide resources for cleaner economic growth. Originally optimistic projections were that the 
CDM could lead to investments of between $24 and $37 billion in developing countries between 
2000 and 2012 (La Rovere & Thorne, 1999: 2), but due to delays in clarifying the international 
rules of the CDM and the withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol of the United States the actual figure 
may be in the vicinity of $2 billion3.  
 
The aims of the CDM 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol defines the purpose of the CDM as assisting non-Annex 1 parties 
achieve sustainable development and aid Annex 1 parties in achieving compliance with their 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments. In order to accomplish this a series of 
procedures and modalities for the implementation of the CDM have been established as well as an 
institutional structure to guide and govern the CDM. This section will discuss the CDM project 
cycle, how the modalities and institutions of the CDM function and how they can be used to 
promote the use of the CDM. 
 
The CDM project cycle 
The CDM project cycle consists of a series of procedures that have to be carried out in order to 
establish an activity as a CDM project. The project cycle is made up of various steps, that once 
completed culminate in the issuance of CERs. The description of these steps is adapted from the 
CDM Guide produced by FIELD4 and UNEP’s “Introduction the CDM”. The process is illustrated 
in figure 5.2 below. 
                                                 
3 Annex 1 countries are looking to buy 490 million tonnes of CERs at an average market price of $5 per tonne (MEWC 
et al, 2005:5) 
4 Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development - FIELD 
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Figure 5.2: The CDM project cycle 
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timeline and crediting period5, a monitoring methodology, calculation of GHG emissions by source 
and stakeholder comments.  
 
The host country is also involved in the project design phase through the DNA and it is here that the 
host country can assert influence on CDM projects. The DNA must issue statements on the PDD 
indicating that the government of the host country participates voluntarily in the proposed activity 
and that the project assists the host country in achieving sustainable development.  
 
Baselines 
Before moving on to the next step in the CDM project cycle a short explanation of baselines and the 
role they play is provided below. 
 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol dictates that CDM projects must provide additional reductions in 
emissions than would have occurred in the absence of the project. The prerequisite that all CDM 
projects be additional to a business-as-usual scenario requires the construction of a baseline 
reference case. This represents the level of emissions that would have existed in the absence of the 
project activity. Baselines can be establish using existing or historical emissions, emissions from a 
technology that represents an economically attractive course of action or the average emissions of 
similar project activities undertaken in the previous five years in comparable economic, social, 
environmental and technological circumstances and whose performance is among the top 20% of 
their category. Methodologies for determining baselines must be submitted to the EB for approval. 
If the EB endorses a methodology it is made publicly available and can be used by subsequent 
CDM projects with similar characteristics.  
 
2. Validation and Registration 
Validation is a process involving an independent evaluation of the project activity by an external 
auditor known as a Designated Operational Entity6 (DOE), which is hired by the project 
participants. The DOE reviews the PDD in order to determine whether the project meets CDM 
requirements. The responsibilities of the DOE are to confirm that the project is indeed additional 
                                                 
5 A crediting period is the period of time during which a proposed project’s emissions are measured for the calculation 
of CDM credits that should be issued. Crediting periods may either be for a maximum of seven years,  which may be 
renewed at most two times, or a maximum of ten years with no option of renewal. 
6 All DOEs have to be accredited by the EB and are generally auditing and accounting firms, consultancies and law 
firms. 
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and ensure that the assumptions and calculations used in the PDD are realistic and adequate. Once a 
project activity has been validated by a DOE a validation report is forwarded to the EB for 
registration as a CDM project.  
 
The registration of a project will be final within eight weeks after the date of receipt by the EB 
unless at least three members of the EB request a review of the project activity. Such a review 
involves the EB determining whether the project is consistent with the aims and regulations of the 
CDM. It is here that the EB can exercise its authority and influence the types of projects approved 
and the stringency of the additionality requirements as discussed in the previous section. In order to 
ensure the transparency of the project evaluation process it is open to public comment through 
hearings and via the Internet. 
 
3. Monitoring 
Once the project is operational the emissions that occur from the activity must be monitored. This is 
done according to the monitoring plan submitted and approved in the PDD, which indicates the 
method used for measuring emissions from the project and how data relevant for these calculations 
will be collected and archived. The information on emission reductions must be included in a 
monitoring report estimating the amount of CERs generated and submitted to a DOE for 
verification. 
 
4. Verification and certification 
Verification is the independent review of the monitoring report submitted by the project 
participants. A DOE different to that involved in the validation process carries out verification. The 
DOE must ensure that the CERs have been generated according to the guidelines and conditions 
agreed upon during the validation of the project. A verification report is then produced. 
 
The same DOE that verified the project also certifies the CERs generated by the activity. 
Certification is the written assurance from a DOE that the project achieved the stated level of 
emission reductions and that these reductions were real, measurable and additional. The 
certification report constitutes a request to the EB for issuance of CERs. Unless a project participant 
or at least three members of the EB request a review within fifteen days the EB will instruct the 
CDM registry to issue the CERs. 
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Small-scale CDM projects 
Due to the administrative burden of the CDM procedures on small-scale project activities (SSP) 
simplified rules for validation, registration and monitoring were introduced. This section will 
provide a short explanation of the simplified modalities for SSPs.  
 
CDM activities must meet with the following criteria if they are to qualify for the simplified 
modalities for SSPs; 
• Renewable energy activities with a maximum output capacity equivalent to 15MW. 
• Energy efficiency project activities, which reduce energy consumption, on the supply 
and/or demand side, by up to the equivalent of 15 GWh per annum.  
• Other project activities that both reduce anthropogenic emissions by sources and directly 
emit less than 15 kilo tonnes of CO2 equivalent annually.   (e7, 2003: 26) 
 
A proposed SSP must fall into one of the project categories listed in table 5.1 below. If a proposed 
SSP does not fall into one of the categories listed below then a new SSP activity category an be 
submitted to the EB for approval.  
 
Table 5.1: Eligible small-scale project activity categories (e7, 2003: 26) 
Project types Small-scale project activity categories 
Renewable energy projects a. Electricity generation by the user 
b. Mechanical energy for the user 
c. Thermal energy for the user 
d. Renewable electricity generation for a grid 
Energy efficiency projects a. Supply-side EE improvements-transmission and 
distribution 
b. Supply-side EE improvements-generation 
c. EE and fuel switching measures for industrial 
facilities 
d. EE and fuel switching for buildings 
Other project activities a. Agriculture 
b. Switching fossil fuels 
c. Emission reductions by low GHG emitting 
vehicles 
d. Methane recovery and avoidance 
 
The measures taken to facilitate the implementation of  SSPs are a simplified PDD, baseline 
methodologies by project category, the bundling of SSPs for the purpose of validation and 
monitoring, the same DOE may undertake validation, verification and certification and a shorter 
timeframe for registration of SSPs of four weeks if no review is requested.  
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Transaction costs 
The CDM project cycle is an expensive exercise to undertake due to the extra requirements imposed 
on CDM project activities to ensure the environmental integrity of the mechanism. This requires the 
use of external experts in the form of DOEs and the payment of registration fees to the EB and 
DNA  (if regulations in the host country require it) as well as the monitoring of emissions. An 
analysis for the Austrian JI/CDM programme showed that transaction costs will vary between 
€30,000 and €100,000 per project depending on project type and framework conditions in the host 
country (UNIDO, 2004: 4).  
 
The proportionally higher transaction costs for smaller projects was the driving force behind the 
COP’s decision to developed a special framework for small-scale projects (SSP) discussed in the 
previous section. There are, however, some transaction costs that are common to all projects. These 
include an adaptation levy where two percent of the CERs produced by a CDM project are 
transferred into an adaptation fund. This levy is used to help small island states and the least 
developed countries adapt to the effects of climate change. CDM projects undertaken in the least 
developed countries are exempt from the adaptation fee.  
 
The reduction of transaction costs for host countries is important if they are to attract CDM projects. 
High transaction costs in a country will result in reduced demand for CDM projects, as fewer 
activities will be financially viable. It is expected that countries with efficient regulatory 
frameworks will have lower transaction costs than those with inefficient regulation thereby giving 
them a competitive advantage (Michaelowa et al, 2003: 3). This is due to the difficulties in 
determining baselines and common practice in order to verify additionality in countries with 
inefficient regulation as well as potential difficulties in interactions with such governments. 
 
The institutions of the CDM 
The most important institutions of the CDM are the Executive Board (EB) and the Designated 
National Authorities (DNA). The EB functions internationally and is responsible to the Meeting of 
the Parties (MOP), whilst the DNAs are national institutions run by governments that are parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol.  
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The Executive Board 
The EB supervises the CDM and is under the authority of the MOP. The EB plays a pivotal role in 
the CDM and is responsible for maintaining the integrity of the CDM and for exercising regulatory 
functions by elaborating the existing rules and providing guidance on how certain regulations 
should be interpreted. The duties of the EB include approving new methodologies for determining 
baselines, accrediting DOEs, maintaining a CDM registry, addressing issues relating to the 
observance of modalities and procedures of the CDM by project participants and issuing CERs to 
project activities.  
 
The EB is made up of ten members7 drawn from signatories of the Kyoto Protocol. There must be 
one member from each of the five United Nations regional groups, two additional members from 
Annex 1 countries, two other members from non-Annex 1 countries and a representative of the 
small island developing states. Each delegate may be elected for a period of two years and may only 
serve two terms on the EB. The EB is advised by panels of experts on the accreditation of CDM 
activities and methodologies as well as by working groups on the issues of small-scale projects and 
afforestation and reforestation. External expertise can also be utilised when required. The figure 
below shows the institutional set-up of the EB.  
 
                                                 
7 There are ten alternates on the EB that have the responsibility of standing in for members that are unable to attend an 
EB meeting. The alternates’ regional representation is the same as the EB members. 
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Figure 5.1: The institutional set-up and decision-making process of the Executive Board (adapted from Netto, 
2004: 1) 
 
Even though the EB is allowed to utilise external consultants there is a growing problem involving 
the workload the board members have to cope with. The number of CDM projects submitted to the 
EB is increasing rapidly and it will soon be very difficult for the limited resources of the Board to 
cope with the additional workload considering the fact that board members are not employed on a 
fulltime basis. This could lead to a situation whereby the EB does not have the capacity to consider 
all the projects being submitted to it. The danger of this is that it could undermine the integrity of 
the CDM if it is not possible for the EB to regard the projects and methodologies submitted to it for 
approval. The obvious solution is to appoint external consultants to do this, but this has not proved a 
popular option as it could result in a loss of political influence of members of the EB. It remains 
unclear how this issue will be resolved but it seems inevitable that the role DOEs play in the CDM 
project cycle will be strengthened due to the inability of the EB to review all projects submitted. 
This is due to the role that DOEs play in confirming the additionality of CDM activities as well as 
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monitoring emission reductions. The EB should, therefore, rather concentrate on the reliability and 
integrity of the DOEs in order to ensure the environmental integrity of the CDM.  
 
Arguably one the most important function of the EB is that of approving baseline methodologies 
and in this way setting precedence for its interpretation of additionality. The EB’s interpretation of 
additionality is an important factor that influences the global supply of carbon credits (Broekhoff & 
Trexler, 2003: 1). A very stringent interpretation of additionality will most likely lead to few CDM 
projects being developed and a low amount CERs being produced through the mechanism. Some 
would argue that the projects initiated under such a scenario would have much greater benefits for 
host countries but this scenario would not necessarily be in the best interests of the CDM. One of 
the mechanisms aims is to assist Annex 1 countries achieve compliance with their emissions targets, 
which would not be the case if the number of projects were to be greatly restricted by an over 
zealous additionality requirement. This would not be in the interest of non-Annex 1 countries either 
as it would greatly reduce the potential investments in developing countries through the CDM and 
hence development opportunities. On the other hand if additionality is applied laxly this may reduce 
the opportunity for non-Annex 1 countries to receive real benefits from the CDM through 
technology transfer and achieving sustainable development as well as leading to a situation whereby 
Annex 1 countries could get around their Kyoto commitments through projects in developing 
countries that would have occurred in the absence of the CDM. This would not result in real 
reductions of GHG emissions on a global scale, which is contrary to the aims of the UNFCCC.  
 
When the EB first began to function there was a great deal of speculation over how the EB would 
interpret additionality. As it turned out the EB’s first decision on proposed methodologies indicated 
that it would enforce a relatively strict interpretation of additionality. As the EB works on a case-
law basis the first decisions set precedence for similar projects to follow. This has lead to some 
pressure being applied on the EB to relax its interpretation of additionality and increase the amount 
of projects permissible under the CDM. Japan in particular is pressing for this and it is expected that 
Canada would support such an initiative (Pointcarbon, 4/7/2005). The EB has already relaxed its 
interpretation of the additionality of projects that are in compliance with legal requirements and 
regulations. The current interpretation is that if legislation or regulation is not enforced in a non-
Annex 1 country then projects implementing this legislation can still be considered additional. An 
example of this is the legal requirement in India that methane emissions be flared (Stehr, 
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14/10/2004). This has not been implemented and, therefore, landfill gas projects in India are 
considered additional if they live up to the remaining criteria in an additionality test. There is, 
however, no indication from the EB of where the cut-off point for non-enforcement of regulations 
and legislation is and it does not appear that the EB has considered whether this interpretation may 
provide an incentive for non-Annex 1 countries not to enforce existing environmental regulations 
and standards. 
 
Many regard the approval of methodologies for the decomposition of HFC and N2O as an indication 
that the EB is relaxing its additionality requirements as some consider that these project types 
merely shift the location at which emissions reductions occur without delivering sustainable 
development benefits to the host country such as a shift in energy production and a move towards 
energy efficiency (Pearson, 2005:11). The CDM is currently dominated by projects involving HFC, 
N2O and landfill gas decomposition even though these projects generally involve end-of-pipe 
technologies and have few direct environmental, economic or social benefits other than the 
abatement of GHG emissions and have few outputs other than CERs (Ellis et al, 2004: 32). The 
merits of these project types can be discussed but they are not an indication that the EB is relaxing 
the additionality requirements for CDM activities. Additionality refers only to whether a project 
would have occurred in the absence of the CDM or not. If it is unlikely that the project would have 
taken place it can be deemed additional, which is the conclusion the EB came to in these instances. 
It is the host nations prerogative to determine the merits of each project with regards to its 
contribution to achieving sustainable development and not the responsibility of the EB. This will be 
discussed in the next section of this chapter.  
 
The EB’s responsibility for interpreting the modalities and procedures agreed on under the 
Marrakech Accord stretches to more than the additionality of baseline methodologies. An important 
decision of relevance for this project was on the permissibility of unilateral CDM projects. Due to 
the trend mentioned in the introduction that Annex 1 countries are generally not willing to carry the 
financial risk of developing CDM activities but prefer to purchase CERs once produced. This led to 
speculation on whether a project can be registered as a CDM activity without an Annex 1 partner 
having to be involved in the project as the Marrakech Accord appears to stipulate. The EB came to 
the compromise that unilateral projects could be registered but that CERs cannot be issued to the 
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project, only to an Annex 1 country that has agreed to purchase the credits produced by the activity. 
This prevents non-Annex 1 countries from accumulating credits.  
   
An important issue that the EB is currently considering is the approval of sector-based initiatives 
with regards the introduction of mandatory standards. A new methodology has been proposed for 
approval by the EB, which involves the production of CERs through mandatory national appliance 
standards for EE in Ghana. This is an important case for the EB, as the approval of such a project as 
a CDM activity would open the door for other non-Annex 1 countries to gain credits from 
introducing EE standards. The advantage of doing this is that it may reverse the tendency of the 
CDM to discourage initiatives by non-Annex 1 countries to introduce regulation on issues such as 
EE. There are, however, some problems with this approach such as the difficulty of measuring 
actual reductions in GHG emissions and the problem of ownership of such a project. Is it those that 
buy the appliances approved by the standards that own the CERs or is it the government that applies 
the standards? The EB has the difficult task of determining this. It appears, however, that the issue 
will be referred to the MOP for clarification, as the EB may not have the authority to approve such a 
project as the CDM is designed as a project-based mechanism, whilst the Ghanaian initiative is a 
sector-based initiative. 
 
Designated National Authority   
All parties wanting to participate in the CDM must establish a Designated National Authority 
(DNA) in order to approve project activities. In non-Annex 1 countries the DNA is the key entity 
involved with the CDM and is responsible for ensuring that the host country maintains control over 
CDM activities occurring in its territory. This is achieved through ensuring that CDM activities 
fulfil the sustainable development objectives determined by the host nation. Other responsibilities 
of the DNA in non-Annex 1 countries are to issue host nation approvals and to review all relevant 
national regulatory aspects regarding CDM projects.  
 
The DNA can also play an important role in promoting and supporting CDM activities in non-
Annex 1 countries. Initiatives such as the development of a national policy and regulatory 
framework to promote CDM transactions, management of CERs retained by the host country, 
encouraging the development of local designated operating entities (DOE), information exchange, 
marketing and promotion of the CDM and encouraging project development (UNDP, 2003: 60). 
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 The DNA provides the host country with the means of influencing the types of CDM projects that 
are undertaken in its territory, which gives the host country the ability to manipulate CDM 
investments into areas that it considers most important. This can be done, as there are no 
stipulations as to what the sustainability criteria should include. The decision of what comprises 
sustainable development is left entirely up to the host party. There is a risk that as more and more 
high-volume, low-investment CDM projects are approved, such as the end-of-pipe solutions 
discussed in the previous section, so the competition between non-Annex 1 countries to attract 
CDM investments will increase, which will lead to sustainability criteria being largely ignored in 
favour of cheaper, low-benefit projects.    
 
There are external pressures on DNAs from both NGOs and project developers. This is due to the 
important role the DNA plays in the CDM project cycle. NGOs have generally been pressurising 
DNAs to introduce stringent sustainability criteria based on the Gold Standard developed by the 
WWF. This initiative has, however, not met with much success as non-Annex 1 parties are 
generally nervous of discouraging investment in CDM projects by introducing strict sustainability 
requirements. There are few project developers that adhere to the Gold Standard voluntarily and the 
market for more expensive CERs with a high sustainability effect is very small. Generally project 
developers prefer that sustainability requirements are kept to a minimum and that there is a simple 
process for approving projects in the shortest possible time. It would appear that non-Annex 1 
governments generally share the views of project developers as no DNA has yet made use of the 
Gold Standard. This is compounded by the fact that Annex 1 countries consider the price of CERs 
as the most important factor in purchase agreements.   
 
Even though the advancement of sustainability in developing countries is one of the aims of the 
CDM it is unlikely that it will be achieved with any great success. This is due to the fact that the 
sustainable development benefits of a project do not generate revenue for CDM activities. With the 
CERs being the commodity in a project it is their production that will be prioritised above 
sustainable development. The effect of this is that DNAs generally have a passive role in the CDM 
and that the environmental and social benefits of CDM activities are relegated in favour of the 
production of cheap CERs.     
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The South African DNA 
The DNA in South Africa was officially launched on December the 1st 2004 and falls under the 
control of the DME. The DNA is overseen by an Advisory Committee, which acts in an advisory 
capacity and is responsible for coordinating support for the CDM in government departments. This 
Advisory Committee is made up of representatives of the DME, Dept. of Trade and Industry (DTI), 
Dept. of Environment and Tourism, Dept. of Science and Technology, National Treasury, Dept. of 
Agriculture, Dept. of Transport and the Dept. of Water Affairs and Forestry. A CDM Promotions 
sub-committee made up of representatives from the DME, DTI and a number of parastatals such as 
Eskom and the Central Energy Fund (CEF) is to review and coordinate the implementation and 
promotion of the CDM in South Africa. This sub-committee is yet to be established. The 
promotional activities will be carried out by the DNA and by the administrative capacity of the DTI. 
This is to avoid a conflict of interest between the regulatory and promotional functions of the DNA. 
Figure 5.3 below illustrates the governance structure of the DNA.  
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Figure 5.3: Governance structure of the DNA in South Africa (based on www.dme.gov.za/about/dna.htm) 
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The second procedure in the approval process is mandatory for all CDM projects in South Africa. 
All project developers are required to submit a PDD to the DNA. A DOE must validate the PDD 
before it is submitted to the DNA. The PDD is posted on the DNA’s website for public comment 
for a period of 30 days and is available to interested parties upon request. The DNA then evaluates 
the project on the basis of the information provided in the PDD and the comments received during 
the public consultation period before submitting its recommendations to the Advisory Committee. 
Based on comments from the Advisory Committee the DNA makes its final decision on the 
approval of the project and if successful issues a Letter of Approval to the project developer.  
 
The DNA has released a timeframe for the approval process of CDM projects in South Africa. The 
initial screening process takes a maximum of 30 working days to be processed whilst the period 
between submission of the PDD and receipt of a decision should be no more than 45 working days.  
 
The DNA uses the definition of sustainable development provided in the National Environmental 
Management Act. This describes sustainable development as “the integration of social, economic 
and environmental factors into planning, implementation and decision making so as to ensure that 
development serves present and future generations.” The DNA will evaluate projects according to 
this definition using three criteria:  
• Economic, does the project contribute to national economic development? 
• Social, does the project contribute to social development in South Africa? 
• Environmental, does the project conform to the National Environmental Management 
Act’s principles of sustainable development? 
 
In addition to the three criteria stated above the DNA also uses a general criterion that encompasses 
both economic and social factors that a potential CDM activity must fulfil. In determining whether a 
project lives up to these criteria the DNA considers each project with the indicators of sustainability 
given in table 5.2 below.  
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Table 5.3: Sustainable development criteria for CDM projects in South Africa 
(http://www.dme.gov.za/home.asp?menu=main) 
Criteria Indicator 
Impact on local 
environmental quality 
• Impact of the project on air quality   
• Impact of the project on water pollution   
• Impact of the project on the generation or disposal of 
solid waste   
• Any other positive or negative environmental impacts of 
the project (such as impacts on noise, safety, visual 
impacts, or traffic) 
 
Change in usage of natural 
resources 
• Impact of the project on community access to natural 
resources   
• Impact of the project on the sustainability of use of 
water, minerals or other non-renewable natural 
resources   
• Impact of the project on the efficiency of resource 
utilisation   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmental 
Impacts on biodiversity and 
ecosystems 
• Changes in local or regional biodiversity arising from 
the project 
 
Economic impacts • Impact of the project on foreign exchange requirements   
• Impact of the project on existing economic activity in 
the area   
• Impact of the project on the cost of energy   
• Impact of the project on foreign direct investment   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic 
Appropriate technology 
transfer  
• Positive or negative implications for the transfer of 
technology to South Africa arising from the project   
• Impacts of the project on local skills development   
• Demonstration and replication potential of the project  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alignment with national 
provincial and local 
development priorities 
• How the project is aligned with provincial and national 
government objectives   
• How the project is aligned with local developmental 
objectives Impact of the project on the provision of, or 
access to, basic services to the area   
• Impact of the project on the relocation of communities if 
applicable   
• Contribution of the project to specific sector objectives 
(for example, renewable energy targets)  
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Social Social equity and poverty 
alleviation 
• Impact of the project on employment levels? (Specify 
the number of jobs created/lost; the duration of time 
employed, distribution of employment opportunities, 
types of employment, categories of employment 
changes in terms of skill levels and gender and racial 
equity)    
• Impact of the project on community social structures   
• Impact of the project on social heritage   
• Impact of the project on the provision of social 
amenities to the community in which the project is 
situated   
• Contribution of the project to the development of 
previously underdeveloped areas or specially designated 
development nodes   
 
General General project acceptability • Is the distribution of project benefits reasonable and 
fair?  
 
 
 
Comments on the DNA 
The South African DNA is functional and is under the jurisdiction of the DME with stipulated 
sustainability criteria. The role of the Advisory Committee, however, seems redundant as it has the 
responsibility of considering each case for approval. This two-tiered system is unnecessarily 
cumbersome. The DNA should have a mandate to approve projects without needing to refer every 
decision to the Advisory Committee. This could reduce the timeframe for approving projects, which 
in turn may reduce transaction costs for CDM activities in South Africa. The Advisory Committee 
should have the role of reviewing the overall progress of the CDM in South Africa and whether the 
sustainability criteria and the DNA are functioning as intended. This more holistic function would 
ensure that the financial resources of the Advisory Committee are not be expended on replicating 
the role of the DNA, but rather on creating an enabling environment for CDM investments in South 
Africa. The Advisory Committee should also promote the CDM in government departments in 
order to create awareness of the potentials of the mechanism throughout government circles and 
provide the necessary resources to the Promotional Sub-committee in order to increase investments 
in CDM activities. 
 
South Africa has chosen to use the sustainability criteria in the National Environmental 
Management Act, which is quite sensible in that, in theory, all government policy and legislation 
has to comply with these aims. It is, however, difficult to determine how each project activity will 
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be assessed, as there is no value given to the indicators. A scoring system for each criterion’s 
indicators should be introduced in order to increase the transparency of the process as well as create 
a realistic picture of how each project contributes to achieving sustainability.  
 
In a developing country it is questionable whether many have the necessary access to the Internet 
required to comment on PDDs. It is possible for individuals to have PDDs sent to them by the 
DNA, but public access should be made as easy as possible for the individuals directly affected by 
the project. The importance of this issue is unclear in South Africa as there are strict requirements 
for public participation in environmental impact assessments in the country. This should give 
interested parties a chance to voice their concerns, if any should arise as a result of the project. It 
may, however, be in the interest of project developers to assess local opinion of their project at the 
earliest possible stage. This could help reduce transaction costs and allow for changes in the project 
if they are required in the early phases of the activity.     
 
Summary 
The CDM project cycle has been designed to ensure the environmental integrity of the mechanism 
and the carbon credits produced by CDM activities. In order to do this a system of checks and 
balances has been constructed, which involves a number of steps including the project participants, 
institutions of the CDM and external experts. This is an expensive process, which has resulted in 
transaction costs for instigating a CDM activity being relatively high compared to the price of 
CERs. In recognition of the disadvantage SSPs have in covering transaction cost and the generally 
high contribution to sustainable development that many SSPs have the EB introduced simplified 
modalities and procedures for such activities. Despite these efforts the transaction costs involved in 
carrying out the CDM project cycle remain high. Host countries should consider options to reduce 
transaction costs for CDM activities taking place in their territory by making the approval process 
as efficient as possible and encouraging the creation of local DOEs and nurturing local capacity in 
developing CDM projects.  
 
The most important institutions of the CDM are the EB and the DNA. Each has a responsibility for 
ensuring that the dual aims of the CDM are achieved. This has proved problematic, as the CDM is 
moving increasingly towards cheap, non-CO2 projects with very few environmental and social 
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benefits, but with a large production of CERs. This is due to the fact that sustainable development 
criteria are not enforced very rigorously by DNAs, as they have no economic value. If the CDM is 
to lead to non-Annex countries achieving a more sustainable development then it is necessary to 
give some form of value to the sustainability of a project. This is a question that the MOP has to 
deal with and it is unlikely that there will be much enthusiasm for such an initiative due to the 
difficulties in measuring sustainability and the desire for cheap CERs.  
 
The EB has generally maintained the integrity of the CDM through enforcing additionality, even 
though it has reduced the requirements for this during the lifetime of the CDM. A major problem in 
the CDM process is the fact that the mechanism discourages non-Annex 1 countries to introduce 
regulation and standards on certain environmental issues for fear of undermining the additionality 
criterion in the relevant sector. This has been compounded by the EB accepting the additionality of 
projects that comply with regulation that is not enforced. This provides an initiative to non-Annex 1 
countries not to implement existing regulation. The burgeoning workload that the EB faces as the 
CDM matures is problematic, as it will not possible for the EB to consider every project within the 
timeframe provided for instigating a review. This will make the importance of the impartiality and 
reliability of DOEs paramount if the CDM is to maintain its integrity in the future. 
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The South African Electricity System 
This chapter will discuss the South African electricity system, which forms the framework of the 
research field. The interaction of the government’s priorities for the electricity sector illustrated in 
figure 2.1 (p.8) are the main concerns for the electricity system and the decision-making process in 
energy planning must occur within the framework of these priorities.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the South African electricity system so that an understanding 
of the electricity sector in the country can be reached. This chapter will provide an overview of the 
South African electricity sector as well as the issues of importance to the sector and priorities of the 
major stakeholders in the sector. This will give an understanding of the context in which the 
problem statement occurs and allow for informed and relevant decision-making to occur that 
considers the challenges facing the South African system rather than applying generalised solutions 
based on experiences in other countries. 
 
The first part of the chapter concentrates on the physical infrastructure of the system describing 
electricity generation, transmission and distribution in South Africa. This is followed by a 
discussion on the way the electricity sector is expected to develop in the future and the challenges 
this involves. The final section in this chapter will consist of a stakeholder analysis whereby the 
governance structure of the electricity sector will be discussed as well as the interests of the major 
stakeholders and the role they could play in implementing the CDM. 
 
Physical characteristics of the system 
The South African electricity sector is dominated by the state-owned and vertically integrated 
utility, Eskom, which is the seventh largest electricity supplier in the world in terms of size and 
electricity sales (IISD, 2003: 32). Eskom supplies nearly all of South Africa’s electricity 
requirements and generates more than half of the electricity produced on the African continent. 
Eskom also owns the high voltage transmission grid and supplies about 60% of electricity directly 
to end-users. Local authorities distribute the remainder of electricity, which they buy in bulk from 
Eskom. The existing structure of the electricity sector is illustrated in figure 4.1 below. 
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Figure 4.1: The existing structure of the electricity supply industry (IISD, 2004: 32) 
 
Energy flow in the system 
An overview of the flow of electricity in the system can be seen below in figure 4.2 below. This 
also illustrates how consumption is divided between the various sectors of the South African 
economy. Manufacturing is the greatest consumer of electricity in the country accounting for nearly 
40% of total end-use whilst the residential and mining sectors combined account for 35% of the 
total. The increase in residential consumers connected to the national grid due to the electrification 
programme and a growing middle-class has lead to an increase in demand in peak periods, which 
has had a significant impact on the load profile of the system and increased pressure on the 
available peaking capacity.   
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 Eskom’s licensed capacity totals 39,810 MW of which 36,269 MW is operational and 3,541 MW is 
in the process of being refurbished. The peak demand on Eskom’s capacity in 2003 was 31,928 
MW, which means there was a 12% reserve margin of operational capacity in that year. This 
reserve capacity fell to 8.5% in 2004 (Visser, 19/7/2005), which is low and should be cause for 
concern from both Eskom and the government. A general rule of thumb for an acceptable margin of 
reserve capacity is referred to as the (n –1) rule and entails that there should be enough capacity in 
spinning reserve8 to cater for the failure of the single largest power source. This is not the case with 
a reserve capacity of 8.5% as this corresponds to 3,083 MW whilst Eskom’s largest power plant, 
Kendal, has a capacity of 4,116 MW. This can lead to instability in electricity supply for end users.  
 
This appears to have been the case in the winter of 2004 where load shedding occurred in several 
areas in South Africa due to an inability to meet the demand for electricity (Namibian Economist, 
18/6/2004). The Minister for Minerals and Energy, however, denied there is a power-generation 
capacity crisis in the budget speech of 2005 pointing to an additional 1,000 MW of peak capacity 
that is expected to be commissioned at the end of 2008 as well as the Eskom’s plans to 
recommission 2,964 MW of coal-fired capacity between 2008 and 2012. In fact some of the 
mothballed capacity is already functioning as an integral part of the electricity mix even though the 
original intention was that it should be running as a pilot return-to-service project. This situation has 
arisen due to growth in domestic demand being higher than Eskom predicted (Engineering News, 
24/5/2005) and could be an indication that capacity shortages are more serious than either the 
government or the state utility care to admit.  
 
The reason for denying that a shortage of generating capacity exists, apart from political 
embarrassment, is the fear of creating uncertainty in industry about the ability of the state utility to 
guarantee electricity supply. The government actively tries to attract energy intensive industry such 
as smelters using the low electricity price as its main selling card. Uncertainty surrounding the 
security of supply may cause uncertainty amongst potential investors as well as in existing industry. 
 
                                                 
8 In order to ensure that there is sufficient capacity available to respond rapidly to a sudden increase in electricity 
demand it is necessary that some thermal power stations in a system are kept in a condition known as spinning reserve. 
This refers to power plants that produce electricity at a reduced load in order to ensure electricity supply can be 
maintained should there be an unexpected loss of generating capacity in the system.   
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Current fuel mix 
92% of the electricity produced in South Africa is done so by coal-fired power stations of which 
there are seventeen in the country, ten of them owned by Eskom. The predominance of coal as the 
preferred fuel is due to the large domestic deposits of cheap, low-grade coal that exist in the 
northeast of the country. More than 40% of the coal produced in South Africa is used for producing 
electricity (IISP, 2004: 7). The coal burnt by Eskom cannot be exported due to the very high ash 
content of up to 45% and is, therefore, earmarked for domestic consumption. Eskom expects to burn 
111 million tonnes of coal in the financial year 2005/06. Even though other primary energy sources 
will play a greater role in the future, South African electricity production will continue to be largely 
based on coal (Nassiep, 4/11/2004). This is due to the fact that coal is cheap and locally mined 
whilst fuels such as natural gas have to be imported or are locally available in very small 
quantities9. The potential for imported gas from Namibia is in the vicinity of 2,000 MW and could 
be utilised along the western seaboard whilst the potential from Mozambique is about 1,000 MW, 
which could be utilised along the KwaZulu-Natal coastline (Etzinger, 2003: 15). The price of 
natural gas remains much higher than that of coal. 
 
There is one nuclear power station in South Africa, which is situated near Cape Town and owned by 
Eskom. It has a capacity of 1,800 MW and produces 5.8% of South Africa’s electricity. Bagasse is a 
waste product of sugar refineries and is the major fuel used by the sugar industry to produce 
electricity for internal consumption. Bagasse accounts for 0.12% of electricity production. Pumped 
storage uses water as its primary source of energy. During periods of low cost generation water is 
pumped to a reservoir above the power plant. During peak periods the water is allowed to flow 
through turbines into a reservoir below and in this way produce electricity that can be sold at a 
higher price. Even though many in South Africa refer to pumped storage as a renewable form of 
energy it is far from it. Pumped storage is a way of recycling cheaply produced excess electricity 
from coal and nuclear power plants to be sold for a higher price during periods of greater demand. 
Pumped storage results in an overall loss of electricity and is a form of supply management. There 
are three pumped storage facilities in South Africa, two are owned by Eskom and one by Cape 
Town Municipality. These facilities were responsible for 1.4% of total electricity output, but 
consumed 1.8% of the total electricity output (NER, 2005a: 13). Ten hydroelectric plants produce 
0.37% of the total electricity.  
                                                 
9 South Africa has small deposits of natural gas but these are generally used for the production of synthetic fuels. 
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 Future plans for capacity expansion 
The NER and Eskom have developed a National Integrated Resource Plan (NIRP), which maps out 
the commissioning of new capacity until 2022. The name of the plan is misleading as it is based 
solely on least-cost rather than an integrated approach that includes environmental, health and 
employment benefits. Even though the environmental effects of each alternative are summarised in 
the NIRP they appear to play no role in the final decision as the preferred option has the highest 
CO2 emissions, the joint-highest SOx and NOx emissions as well as the highest water usage. In fact 
in all the environmental indicators used the preferred option performs worst except for particulate 
emissions where all the alternatives have the same effect. The NIRP includes an annual total of 152 
MW of displaced capacity using DSM, but does not include EE specifically. This is a curious 
exclusion as EE is generally the least-cost option when it comes to containing the need for new 
capacity. The DSM goal of 152 MW can hardly be considered a stiff challenge considering it 
equates to only 0.4% of Eskom’s operational capacity. The NIRP concludes that coal will remain 
the fuel of choice over the twenty-year planning period with 86.75% of the generating capacity been 
coal-fired. 
 
The NIRP includes a cost estimate for the inclusion of RE in the system, but by its own admission 
this is not done on a least-cost basis (NER, 2003: 28). This is strange as this is considered the most 
important factor for considering non-renewable options in the NIRP. Only wind and solar power are 
considered (these are the most expensive RE options) as the NIRP states that there is a lack of 
reliable data for other forms of RE. An interesting point when one considers that the only renewable 
energy sources used at present in the South African electricity mix are biomass and small-scale 
hydropower10. These assumptions lead to the NIRP estimating that the abatement costs for CO2 in 
South Africa using RE are R481 per tonne (NER, 2003: 30). Table 4.1 below is taken from the 
NIRP and indicates the timeframe and implementation plans for new capacity in South Africa. 
 
                                                 
10 Eskom operates four wind turbines at Klipheuwel in the Western Cape, which are licensed as a pilot project.  
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Table 4.1: NIRP for the building of new generating capacity in South Africa (NER, 2003: 23) 
 
The table indicates the different technologies that will be implemented, the year in which they will 
be commissioned and the number of MW of capacity to be commissioned in that year. 
 
The NIRP is a blueprint for the development of the electricity sector, but is an uninspiring 
document based on a computer programme’s forecast of electricity demand and supply options. 
Very little notice is taken of the potential of EE, DSM and renewables nor the changing market 
conditions of the electricity sector or development policies of the government. The DME has also 
produced an Integrated Energy Plan (IEP), which is based on the NIRP, comes to more or less the 
same conclusions and also excludes EE and RE from most of its considerations. It is, however, the 
intention of the DME to publish a new IEP in 2006, which will include RE and EE in the system 
(Nassiep, 4/11/2004). Eskom has its own Integrated Strategic Electricity Plan (ISEP), which differs 
from the other plans in that new capacity is introduced to the system more quickly, but the overall 
capacity added over the planning period is the same as the NIRP and the IEP. The ISEP is not 
available to the general public. 
 
The government earmarked R 93 billion that Eskom is to invest in new generating capacity over the 
next five years, which will result in 5,304 MW of new capacity by the end of 2009 (Engineering 
News, 24/5/2005). This is made up of the reintroduction of the mothballed capacity, upgrades to 
existing plants and the building of new peaking capacity. 30% of the required new capacity has 
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been earmarked for IPPs. This initiative has been started by the tendering of 1,000 MW of peaking 
capacity by the DME to be commissioned at the end of 2008. The tendering process is currently 
underway. In order to entice interest from potential investors the government has asked Eskom to 
commit to a fifteen-year power purchase agreement with the winning bidder. As an added incentive 
the government has agreed to bear the costs of the environmental impact assessment studies for the 
project (Lünsche, 19/7/2005). 
 
Eskom has recently signed an agreement with Siemens to build two peak-capacity power plants in 
the Western Cape. Both plants will be open cycle gas turbine (OCGT) units and will be fired using 
liquid fuel and have a capacity of 588 MW and 440 MW when commissioned. The contract was 
awarded in July 2005 with delivery expected in April 2007. This is a realistic timeframe, but is 
nonetheless a very tight schedule. This probably reflects the lack of capacity the South African 
electricity sector is suffering under at present as using such a tight schedule for the project will 
result in higher construction costs as well as reducing the choices of technology and the option of 
which fuel to use in the new plant. This indicates that both Eskom and the government have either 
been taken unawares by the increase in electricity demand or that they were unable to tackle the 
situation despite the knowledge that it would arise. 
 
Transmission 
Eskom owns and operates the national high voltage transmission system in South Africa. Due to the 
concentration of the power generation system in the northeast of the country the transmission 
network in the country is very comprehensive in order to supply electricity to the southern and 
western regions of South Africa. The transmission system consists of 26,772 km of transmission 
line with an operating voltage of 132 kV or above (NER, 2005a: 22). As shown in map 3.2 the 
transmission system also consists of 6 high voltage transmission lines supplying South Africa’s 
neighbouring countries with electricity. The overall losses in the transmission system for 2003 were 
3.93% (NER, 2005a: 19). 
 
The government plans to create an independent, state-owned transmission company that will be 
responsible for allowing equal access to all electricity generators in a liberalised market, but there 
are no plans on the table for implementing this. 
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 Distribution 
This sub-section will consider the current state of the distribution sector before discussing the future 
plans for the development of the sector. 
 
Current situation in the distribution sector 
Eskom Distribution and the municipalities control the distribution of electricity in South Africa 
although Eskom also supplies large industrial consumers that purchase power directly from the 
transmission net. How the total number of customers and total electricity sales are divided between 
Eskom and the municipalities can be seen in tables 4.2 and 4.3 below. In 2003 there were 190 
electricity distributors in South Africa (NER, 2005a: 29). Just about all of the electricity sold by the 
municipalities is purchased from Eskom, but five large public distribution authorities have their 
own generation capacity. 
 
Table 4.2: Number of electricity customers by category (adapted from NER, 2005a: 26) 
Customers Eskom Municipalities 
Category Number % Split Number % Split 
Domestic 3,376,276 49.3 3,470,054 50.7 
Agriculture 78,433 79.2 20,621 20.8 
Mining 1,180 58.9 823 41.1 
Manufacturing 2,988 6.8 40,964 93.2 
Commercial 43,880 18.0 199,332 82.0 
Transport 511 23.7 1,642 76.3 
General* 1,771 4.9 34,334 95.1 
Total 3,505,039 48.2 3,767,770 51.8 
* This category includes own use, street lighting and international sales by distributors 
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Table 4.3: Overview of electricity sales by category of customer (NER, 2005a: 26) 
Customers Eskom Municipalities Total 
Category MWh % Split % Total* MWh % Split % Total* MWh % Total* 
Domestic 7,965,000 23.4 7.2 26,109,593 76.6 32.7 34,074,593 17.9 
Agriculture 4,358,000 84.7 3.9 784,918 15.3 1.0 5,142,918 2.7 
Mining 33,372,000 99.2 30.1 267,741 0.8 0.3 33,639,741 17.6 
Manufacturing 53,715,000 70.7 48.4 22,234,526 29.3 27.9 75,929,526 39.8 
Commercial 6,936,000 32.9 6.3 14,135,177 67.1 17.7 21,071,177 11.0 
Transport 3,182,000 57.2 2.9 2,383,011 42.8 3.0 5,565,011 2.9 
General 1,429,628 9.3 1.3 13,916,728 90.7 17.4 15,346,356 8.0 
Total 110,957,628 58.2 100 79,831,694 41.8 100 190,789,322 100 
* % Total indicates the category’s portion of the total market 
 
Future developments in the distribution sector 
The distribution system in South Africa is in urgent need of reform. Many of the municipalities, 
which act as electricity distributors, are heavily indebted due to customers not paying for services 
provided under apartheid, a trend that still continues, and can no longer provide the services 
expected of them, nor pay for the electricity supplied to them (Clark, 2001: 2). This is of great 
concern as the whole electricity sector depends on the ability of the distributors to collect revenue 
from customers and meet their financial commitments to the generators of electricity. Failure of 
distributors to pay debts to Eskom, or other electricity generators, will ultimately threaten the 
viability of the entire electricity sector (Clark, 2001: 2). 
 
The government intends to reform the industry by introducing six regional distributors, which will 
be divided up according to existing municipal and provincial boundaries wherever possible, yet they 
must contain a significant urban centre of economic activity so as to ensure viability. RED 1 was 
officially launched on the 4th of July 2005 with Cape Town as its urban centre. It is hoped that all 
six REDs will be formed within the next two years and it is expected that REDs centred on Durban 
and Johannesburg will be launched soon. 
 
Proposed reforms to the electricity sector 
There are generally four drivers for implementing power sector reforms in an electricity system. 
These are firstly the desire to improve investment and operational efficiencies, secondly 
technological innovations in efficient, less capital-intensive generation plants and information and 
communication technologies have made it possible to organise the industry so that new entrants can 
compete more easily, thirdly the need for new capacity expansion can increase demands for finance 
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that are not readily available from public sources and finally restructuring and privatisation can 
unlock economic value and reduce economic debt (IISP, 2004: 10). A fifth country specific driver 
can be identified, which is an ideological commitment by government that encompasses the 
liberalisation of the electricity sector. 
 
None of theses drivers are experienced particularly strongly in South Africa. The general perception 
is that Eskom operates efficiently due to the low electricity prices; new more efficient technologies 
such as combined-cycle gas turbines have limited application in South Africa due to the country’s 
limited access to natural gas; Eskom can raise private capital at competitive rates with no recourse 
to the national fiscus and the National Treasury does not require an economic injection from 
privatisation receipts (IISP, 2004: 10). This raises the question of what the drivers for reforms are in 
South Africa? 
 
Three drivers for reform in the electricity sector can be identified. The first driver is the promotion 
of black economic empowerment (BEE). The government wishes to see black South Africans play a 
greater role in the economy through their policy of BEE and considers the electricity sector to be an 
opportunity for black ownership of capital investments. The second driver is the need to improve 
the economic viability of the distribution sector. This is essential to maintain the economic viability 
of the new investments that are required in the generation sector. The third driver is to avoid the 
mistakes that have been made in the past when massive over investment in generating capacity 
occurred in the 1980’ies. Liberalisation of the electricity industry is intended to encourage 
investment efficiency in order to protect consumers from having to cover over investment in 
generating capacity. 
 
The Ministry of Public Enterprises is the catalyst behind the proposed liberalisation and the 
promotion of black economic empowerment in the electricity sector. Plans for liberalising and 
unbundling of the electricity sector have been put on the back burner due to the urgent need for 
investments in new generating capacity. The government, however, is continuing its efforts to 
introduce independent power producers in the generation industry by earmarking 30% of the 
required investments for private investors. 10% of the total new investments are reserved for BEE. 
The proposed structure of the reformed electricity supply industry is illustrated in figure 4.3 below. 
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Figure 4.3: Proposed structure of a reformed electricity supply industry (IISD, 2003: 18) 
 
There is some doubt as to how attractive the South African electricity sector is for private sector 
investments. The dominance of Eskom in the generating sector as well as their ownership of the 
transmission grid may deter investors. In the first tender the DME will negotiate a 15-year power 
purchase agreement for the winning bidder, but it is questionable whether private investors will be 
attracted if they are limited to having to sell to Eskom rather than being afforded free access to the 
transmission grid in order to sell directly to regional distributors (Faniso, 21/4/2005). The DME has, 
however, reported that there is interest from private investors in developing the peaking capacity 
currently on tender. 
 
The liberalisation of the South African electricity sector has been discussed in South Africa for 
many years now without much progress being made. The introduction of the first RED and the first 
tender for privately owned generation capacity are the initial steps towards the goal of a liberalised 
electricity market. Whether the government intends to introduce a viable liberalised market by 
breaking Eskom up and unbundling generation, transmission and distribution is unclear but does not 
appear likely in the short to medium term. This is partly due to opposition from organised labour as 
well as a political uncertainty as to whether a liberalised market will serve the best interests of the 
country. There are some that fear that a reformed market will lead to an increase in electricity 
prices. This price increase is inevitable in the short to medium term due to the need for new 
investments in generating capacity so the question is rather whether a monopoly will make 
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economically efficient investments that will benefit the country more than a liberalised market 
would have and does it provide an enabling environment for EE initiatives? 
 
Summary 
The South African electricity sector is dominated by the state utility Eskom, which is vertically 
integrated and has a virtual monopoly over all sectors of the electricity supply industry. The 
generation sector requires investments in peaking capacity in the short-term in order to ensure 
security of supply. Eskom will be responsible for 70% of the new investments whilst the 
government hopes that the private sector will account for 30% of investments in generating 
capacity. The transmission sector is owned by the state utility and will remain so in the foreseeable 
future. This may deter private investors in the generating sector unless the government provides 
advantageous, long-term power purchase agreements that may well not result in the desired effect 
of increasing economic efficiency in the electricity sector. The distribution sector is slowly being 
reformed to provide a better economic basis for performing the tasks previously done by local 
authorities and Eskom. The first Regional Electricity Distributor (RED) has been established and it 
is intended that this will be followed by the formation of five more REDs in the medium term. The 
South African electricity sector is moving towards a period of increasing prices due to investments 
in new capacity and consolidation of debts in the distribution sector. This may lead to an enabling 
environment for EE initiatives to take hold in South Africa and a culture of awareness of electricity 
consumption arising. 
 
Stakeholders in the Electricity System 
This section will firstly look at the governance structure of the electricity system in South Africa in 
order to determine the role of the stakeholders and the decision-making process. This will be 
followed by a look at the individual stakeholders, their interests and the role they can play in 
implementing the CDM. 
 
The governance structure of the electricity system 
The governance structure of the electricity sector in South Africa can be divided into two, a political 
and regulatory arm consisting of the DME and the NER and a directorial arm consisting of the 
Department of Public Enterprises and Eskom. The political and regulatory arm of the governance 
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structure is dominated by the DME, which is responsible for legislation pertaining to energy and 
suggests political initiatives regarding energy policy. The Minister for Minerals and Energy is also 
responsible for appointing the board of the NER. The role of the NER is primarily that of an 
economic regulator in a monopoly market but it also has responsibility for physical planning in the 
electricity sector. The directorial arm is headed by the Department of Public Enterprises, which is 
the shareholder representative of Eskom in the South African cabinet and appoints the Board of 
Directors for Eskom. The governance structure of the South African electricity system is illustrated 
in. figure 4.4 below. 
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igure 4.4: Governance structure in the South African energy system (Adapted from DANCED & DME, 2001: 51) 
takeholders in the electricity system 
his section is intended as an introduction to the main players in the electricity sector, what their 
oles are, what their interests are and whether they can be active in implementing the CDM. 
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The Department of Minerals and Energy 
The DME is responsible for developing policy in the electricity system. The DME is not only 
responsible for the electricity sector but also for other forms of energy as well as for mining 
operations in the country. The DME is considered to attach more importance to its duties in mining 
rather than energy (Worthington, 23/12/2004), which may be a reason for the slow progress in the 
implementation of energy policy by the department. The DME has traditionally suffered badly from 
a lack of capacity in the field of electricity. This goes back to the secrecy prevalent during the 
apartheid years whereby DME officials were not privy to information from Eskom on supply and 
demand due to security legislation. The capacity situation has improved since the introduction of 
democracy and the DME is much better equipped to carry out its task of developing policy for the 
electricity sector (Grøn, 23/11/204). There is still a problem of continuity as few key officials have 
remained in their posts longer than two or three years, which has meant that institutional memory 
and capacity constantly has to be built up (Eberhard, 2003: 23). This has contributed to the slow 
progress of reform in the electricity sector. It does appear, however, that the DME has reached a 
turning point with the publishing and implementation of the EE strategy as well as increased 
activity on the promoting renewables and the formation of the DNA during the past 18 months. 
Some of this can be put down to the influence of the CDM and the need to delay investments in 
generating capacity, but the CABEERE11 programme and the introduction of Kevin Nassiep as 
Director for Energy Planning and Development have played an important part in developing and 
implementing these initiatives. 
 
The main priorities of the DME are the continuation of the electrification programme that was 
started by Eskom in the early 1990’ies, access to affordable energy services for low-income groups 
and maintaining a low electricity price for industry in order to make South Africa competitive on 
the international market. All policy produced by the DME must consider the effect it will have on 
these initiatives. In order to achieve this the DME has begun to place more and more emphasis on 
EE due to the potential this has for making electricity services more affordable to low-income 
groups and increasing the efficiency of industry by reducing monthly expenditure on energy 
services as well as the possibilities inherent in EE for reducing investments in new generating 
                                                 
11 CABEERE – Capacity Building in Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy is a programme sponsored by Danida 
and run in partnership with the DME.  
 54
capacity. The DME also has a secondary interest in promoting the CDM as it may assist in 
achieving the goals set for EE at minimum cost to the country.  
 
The DME could play an important role in promoting the use of the CDM in South Africa and 
should concentrate on creating an enabling environment for CDM investments in South Africa. This 
is the intention of the DME, but it considers that an enabling environment for CDM relies on a lack 
of regulation on issues such as EE and RE. This reluctance to regulate is also due to an inability to 
enforce regulations as well as a tradition for not forcing policy on the electricity sector.  
 
The National Electricity Regulator 
The NER is the independent regulator of the electricity supply industry and acts under its mandate 
as the custodian and enforcer of a regulatory framework to monitor and ensure that the interests and 
needs of present and future customers of electricity respectively are safeguarded and met with 
regard to the efficiency, effectiveness and long term sustainability of the ESI.  
 
The role of the NER is primarily that of an economic regulator that attempts to produce the same 
pricing in the South African electricity system that a competitive market would exhibit. Its primary 
task is to determine electricity tariffs so as to ensure that suppliers receive a return on their 
investment and are financially able to maintain and expand their services as well as guaranteeing a 
fair price for captive customers. This is done using the Rate of Return (RoR) methodology, which is 
based on the principle that a utility should be allowed to earn revenue that is equal to the cost of 
supply plus an agreed return on the initial investment. This is done following three steps: 
- Costs are reviewed and those deemed unnecessary are eliminated; 
- A rate of return is specified; 
- Prices and their structure are set to generate enough revenue to cover costs and provide a fair 
rate of return.      (Ergas & Small, 2001: 7) 
For a utility this can be simply expressed as follows, 
 
 
R = E + (V – d + w)r 
Where R = the required revenue of the utility, E = cost of supply, V = the value of the qualifying 
assets, d = depreciation on assets, w = the allowance for working capital, r = the rate of return.  
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The NER considers the RoR methodology to be advantageous in the South African context as it 
ensures the financial viability of a regulated utility is maintained as costs are reviewed on a regular 
basis and tariffs set that allows for justified cost increases that ensures the regulated utility a return 
on investments. This reduces the investment risks and, therefore, the return required on capital and 
results in lower electricity prices (NER, 2002: 9). The NER also considers the RoR to be the best 
method of creating stability in a changing electricity market such as is occurring in South Africa as 
it is simple to adjust for unforeseen events, should they occur, and thereby protecting investments 
made in the utility. The RoR attempts to defend the interests of the final consumer whilst also 
guaranteeing a return on capital investments by stakeholders in a utility and it has historically 
proved reasonably effective at achieving public policy objectives but the result is that although 
prices reflect costs, these costs are not necessarily as low as they otherwise could be.   
 
The problem with RoR is the fundamental link between the regulated utility’s prices and costs. This 
provides no incentive to reduce costs and increase efficiency as the gains achieved through 
streamlining production systems will accrue largely to ratepayers and not shareholders (OEB, 1998: 
4). This is reflected by the fact that Eskom has to return profits earned in 2003 and 2004 above 
those agreed under the RoR in reduced future tariff increases for customers due to a claw back 
clause12 included in the annual price determination agreement between Eskom and the NER. The 
excess profits were mostly a result of reduced costs and higher sales volumes. There is, however, a 
possibility that Eskom may be allowed to retain 50% of the increased return as a reward for 
increased efficiency13. It is questionable whether this is wise as the RoR encourages a regulated 
utility to overestimate its costs and assets as well as underestimate demand if the claw back clause 
is not enforced and this type of reward only encourages this. Claw back clauses in RoR regulation 
are standard practice and the NER should enforce them if the RoR is to be implemented 
successfully. Increased costs (E) lead to higher price increases whilst overstated asset value (V) will 
lead to greater returns as is illustrated by the formula used to determine RoR above. This 
encourages over investment in assets as well as underestimation of electricity consumption as the 
price of electricity is based on the assets of the utility as well as the costs involved in covering 
consumption. An underestimation of electricity consumption will result in a higher per unit cost of 
                                                 
12 A clawback clause allows the regulator to recoup excess returns on investments by utilities on behalf of the 
consumer.  
13 This would mimic a sliding-scale type regulation but requires the necessary regulatory framework.  
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electricity, which leads to greater earnings when consumption passes the estimated figure. This can 
be seen when the RoR is expressed as follows, 
 
South Africa experienced a massive over investment in generating capacity in the 1980’ies and it is 
the responsibility of the NER to hinder that such a development occurs again with the ensuing rise 
in electricity prices.  
(kWh x Price) – (Fixed Costs + Variable Costs + Return on Fixed Costs) = Profits 
  
    
                Revenue     –            Costs       = Earnings 
 
Rewarding Eskom for making inaccurate forecasts undermines the entire RoR system and should 
not be allowed.  
 
The NER is attempting to address this issue by introducing a multi-year price determination 
(MYPD), which is expected to come into effect on the 1st of April 2006. It is hoped that this will 
provide reasonable price and revenue certainty over the coming years as Eskom embarks on a major 
investment programme in new capacity whilst living up to the government objective of maintaining 
low prices for low-income groups and retaining the competitive advantage the government feels 
South African industry enjoys from low cost electricity. The new MYPD has not been finalised as 
yet but it will continue to be based on RoR and stretch over an initial three-year period (NER, 
2005b: 3).  
 
In order for the NER to provide incentives for utilities to be more effective and encourage EE 
amongst customers it is important to decouple the correlation between the number of units sold and 
revenue. This can be done using Performance Based Regulation (PBR) that in comparison to cost-
plus regulation provides incentives to improve efficiency as well as reduce investment risk by 
setting a price path for several years and can help identify a utility’s real costs.  
 
Price cap regulation 
Price caps are a form of regulation that focuses on controlling prices directly and works on the 
principle of providing utilities with an incentive to improve efficiency in order to increase profits as 
well as secure a reasonable rate of return on capital and protect the electricity consumer from large 
and/or frequent price fluctuations  (Rudnick & Donoso, 2000: 1428). This is achieved by 
determining prices that are set to cover a utility’s estimated costs over a period of three to seven 
years. The utility is allowed to retain all the additional profits if the costs are reduced by more than 
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the estimated level until the next review period. The efficiency gains are then passed on to the 
consumer by the regulator in the next review period in the form of reduced prices. On the other 
hand the utility has to assume losses if costs are not reduced below the estimated level. 
 
The price cap is determined by originally setting it at a level that covers the utility’s costs and 
provides a fair rate of return. Over the regulatory period (t) of three to seven years the price cap 
(Plim) is then driven by an inflation index (I) and a productivity factor (X) established by the 
regulator. This can be expressed as follows, 
 
 
Plim t = Plim t – 1 . (1 + I – X)  
 
There are disadvantages associated with using the price cap system. The incentives for the regulated 
utility will change over time. When the tenure of the price cap is first introduced it is in the utility’s 
interests to reduce costs immediately in order to benefit from the scheme but as the review date 
approaches it is within the interests of the utility to increase its costs in order to prevent the sinking 
of the price cap. This allows for higher profit margins during the new tenure period and results in 
efficiency improvements between the regulatory reviews not benefiting the customer (Kinnunen, 
2002: 4).  
 
The price cap methodology encourages the utility to minimise all costs associated with its core 
activity but provides a disincentive for activities not associated with core activities such as EE 
programmes. The price cap also provides incentives to expand sales whenever marginal costs of 
production are less than the price cap whilst lowering sales generates less revenues and profits 
(Pagliano et al, 2001: 129). This incentive to increase sales can lead to an unnecessary increase in 
electricity consumption and, therefore, of the national energy bill and result in excessive profits for 
the utility. The price cap does not, therefore, necessarily result in total costs of electricity supply 
being reduced. Introducing EE targets can promote energy conservation but price cap regulation 
does not decouple the correlation between units of electricity sold and revenue earned by the utility.  
 
Revenue cap regulation 
 The revenue cap methodology is similar to the price cap system but differs in that it reduces both 
the incentive and the risk associated with sales. The revenue cap constrains the permitted total 
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revenue of a utility rather than capping the price of the electricity sold. This provides the company 
with an incentive to reduce the average cost per unit output but also the number of units sold so as 
to maximise total profits (OEB, 1998: 14). Under the revenue cap a utility’s allowed revenue is 
constrained and, therefore, the company has incentives to not only reduce costs so as to increase 
profits but also to reduce the number of units sold. This decouples the correlation between profits 
and sales for a utility and is, therefore, compatible with EE programmes. This can be expressed as 
follows, 
 
 
Maximise (P . Q) – (C . Q) Subject to (P . Q) ≤ R 
 
Where P = price per unit (variable), Q = demand, C = cost per unit produced and R = revenue cap. 
This illustrates that demand and profits are not coupled under the revenue cap but it also illustrates 
the greatest problem with the methodology. There is an incentive to increase prices, which will 
result in reduced demand but also reduced costs thereby maximising profits. This can lead to EE 
initiatives amongst consumers but will also result in low-income households not being able to 
afford electricity as well as reduce the competitiveness of industry. There is also a practical problem 
with the revenue cap, which it shares with the price cap, and that is that the regulator requires 
detailed information on the utility to determine the cap perimeters (Lantz, 2005: 13).  
 
 It is necessary for the NER to introduce a new tariff structure if it is to provide utilities with enough 
incentive to introduce EE measures and make the South African electricity system more cost 
reflective and efficient. There are flaws in the PBR methodologies but if they can be combined in a 
sensible manner such that price caps are used but within a revenue window for the utility or if 
revenue caps are used whilst employing a price cap window many of the advantages of both 
systems can be emphasised and the disadvantages reduced.  
 
Eskom 
As the physical make up of Eskom has been described earlier in the chapter this section will 
concentrate on the role Eskom plays in the system. This will include looking at the interests of 
Eskom and the way in which Eskom has reacted to certain issues facing the electricity supply 
industry in South Africa as well as the role Eskom can play in utilising the CDM. 
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Eskom is the dominant force in the South African electricity system. Even though Eskom falls 
under the control of the state and is regulated by the NER it remains the most powerful entity in the 
electricity system for three reasons, there is a tradition in the South African electricity system for 
Eskom to be the primus motor in developing strategy and policy for the electricity sector, Eskom 
has the greatest human and financial capacity in the electricity system to carry out these tasks and 
Eskom is a vertically integrated state-owned monopoly which controls almost 100% of the 
electricity market and is therefore the major stakeholder in matters concerning the electricity 
system.  
 
Eskom is now a tax-paying corporation with the state being the sole shareholder. This was 
completed in 2002 as the first step in restructuring the electricity supply industry. Eskom’s interest 
in the restructuring process has been to maintain its dominant position in the South African 
electricity supply industry. Eskom was alarmed when a World Bank sponsored seminar 
recommended that Eskom’s market share in generation be reduced to 35% and that transmission 
become the responsibility of an independent operator. This lead to Eskom lobbying government in 
order to prevent such a dramatic restructuring drawing on its reputation for delivering low prices 
and supporting government’s development goals (Eberhard, 2003: 46). The government agreed that 
Eskom would maintain no less than 70% of generation but that Eskom would ring-fence its 
generating capacity into clusters for internal competition. This agreement is advantageous for 
Eskom, as a guaranteed 70% stake in the generating market will allow Eskom to continue its 
domination of the electricity supply industry. This will occur, as a monopoly on 70% of generation 
is large enough to dictate prices in a free market and potential competitors are unlikely to be 
reassured that the Eskom generating clusters will allow for true competition.  
 
Eskom’s interest in maintaining their dominant position has been partially responsible for the 
emerging capacity shortage in the country. Eskom has utilised the uncertainty surrounding the 
restructuring of the electricity supply industry to retain its monopoly on generation. The 
government has allowed this to happen by announcing that Eskom would not be permitted to build 
new capacity but without establishing an enabling environment for competitors to enter the market 
in particular by not creating an independent transmission company and failing to consolidate the 
distribution sector. This resulted in the government having to put its plans for a liberalised 
electricity market on hold indefinitely and confirming Eskom as the supplier of last resort when it 
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realised that South Africa was facing a crisis in generating capacity. Eskom’s position is, therefore, 
temporarily secure especially as they maintain control over the transmission company and the can 
cross subsidise new capacity with revenue from amortised power plants and thereby reduce the 
overall impact of increased overheads due to new investments. New entrants into the market do not 
have this possibility. Increasing prices though may turn public opinion against Eskom maintaining 
its monopoly and lead to renewed government interest in establishing a liberalised market. This is 
dependent on whether Eskom invests wisely in new capacity or whether the RoR will once again 
lead to over investment in generating capacity and potentially lead to higher prices for the consumer 
than are necessary.  
 
Eskom can play an important role in promoting the CDM in South Africa through its training 
programme for energy service companies as well as through its access to capital. Eskom should 
include the CDM in training courses for energy service companies so that opportunities for 
developing CDM projects can be recognised by those providing energy consultancy and auditing. 
Eskom can also actively take part in the CDM by developing its own initiatives in both EE and 
renewables. This is possible due to the economic power of Eskom and its access to capital, which is 
often a problem for small project developers. Eskom could develop CDM initiatives in partnership 
with smaller project developers in order to determine the applicability of energy saving 
technologies for the South African market. This could lead to benefits for Eskom by reducing peaks 
in the system and delaying investments in future generating capacity, which may also delay the 
introduction of competition. Eskom could also use the CDM to increase its image as a development 
conscience corporation by improving EE in low-income housing rather than simply supplying them 
with electricity. This would assist in reducing energy poverty in South Africa. 
 
Summary 
The electricity sector in South Africa is nearly entirely dominated by the state utility Eskom. The 
government’s plans to liberalise the sector is intended to break this dominance and encourage 
private investors, especially black empowerment groups, to enter the generation sector. The need 
for reform in the distribution system is essential in order to maintain a stable, economically feasible 
electricity sector in South Africa and will lay the groundwork for private investors to enter the 
generation sector by providing a more stable economic base for the electricity system. The need for 
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new capacity in the coming years will probably lead to price increases for electricity, which will 
provide added incentive for the government to further its EE strategy, as this will reduce the 
expenditure on new generating capacity as well as reduce electricity bills for consumers. 
 
Cabinet heads the governance of the electricity sector. The Minister for Minerals and Energy and 
the Minister for State Enterprises are responsible for legislation regarding energy and Eskom 
respectively. Despite this Eskom has an influential role in both the formulation of energy policy and 
the regulatory process, which are otherwise the responsibility of the DME and the NER. The lack of 
a concrete timeframe and legislation on the future of the electricity sector is problematic for the 
development of a liberalised system, as stability is essential to encourage investment. 
 
The DME and Eskom can play an important role in promoting the use of the CDM in South Africa. 
Eskom is a state-owned corporation and the government should utilise the opportunities this 
presents to pressurise the utility to develop CDM projects that are for general public benefit. The 
DME should play a more active role in defining the government’s goals for utilising the CDM in 
order that interested parties can take up the challenge of developing these projects.  
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Demand-side management and energy efficiency  
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the EE strategy of South Africa and discuss its merits and 
level of implementation. Before doing this a short introduction to demand-side management (DSM) 
will be presented. EE is a form of DSM and it is important to understand the effects EE and other 
DSM initiatives can have on the load profile of a utility in order to understand the interest the South 
African government and Eskom have in reducing the energy intensity of the economy. DSM is 
going to play a more and more important role in South Africa for two reasons, the impending 
shortage of generating capacity and the introduction of competition in the electricity market. EE is 
the most effective form of DSM if it is implemented correctly, but it also poses problems for 
regulators and utilities, especially in a liberalized market. This chapter will look at the EE strategy 
as well as the NER’s regulation of Eskom’s DSM programme. 
 
Demand-side management 
DSM involves an utility influencing a customer’s use of electricity in ways that produce desired 
changes in the utility’s load profile in order to reduce the need for investments in new generating 
capacity. This requires less capital expenditure and investments can be made in smaller units 
compared to the outlays required for new generating capacity. DSM also has the advantage that the 
effects are rapid and predictable and represent a lower risk investment than extra generation 
capacity based on forecast demand growth. DSM initiatives are not only advantageous for utilities 
but generally result in improved services for consumers as well through more stable power supply 
and lower expenditure on electricity. DSM activities can generally be classified into three 
categories, which are described below and illustrated in the figures below.  
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Figures 4.1 & 4.2: The effects on load profiles of load shifting and interruptibility (Acharya, 2001: 7) 
 
• Load shifting is the most common form of DSM and includes peak clipping and valley 
filling. Peak clipping is the reduction of peaking capacity through initiatives such as 
interruptibility of supply for industrial and commercial customers. Peak clipping is not 
only used to defer investments in peaking capacity but is also applied in order to reduce 
operating costs and reliance on more expensive fuels such as natural gas and oil often 
used in peaking capacity. Valley filling entails increasing off-peak loads. This is done in 
order to increase the efficient use of generating capacity in the base load. This involves 
shifting load from peak to off-peak periods by offering customers financial incentives 
such as reduced off-peak tariffs. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: The effects on load profiles of strategic growth (Acharya, 2001: 7) 
• Strategic load growth refers to a general increase in sales stimulated by the utility. This 
is generally applied by utilities with excess generating capacity and usually involves 
large industrial customers receiving long-term contracts at favourable rates. 
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Figure 4.4: The effects on load profiles of energy efficiency (Acharya, 2001: 7) 
• EE allows utilities to change their load profile by reducing end-use consumption. This 
can affect both final sales for the utility and its load profile. Initiatives such as the 
distribution of CFLs, better insulation in buildings and incentives for the use of more 
energy efficient appliances are commonly used in strategic conservation DSM. 
 
Load management is generally in the financial interest of the utility involved as it modifies the load 
pattern in order to improve efficient use of generating equipment. This does not necessarily result in 
a reduction of kilowatt-hours consumed but rather spreads them out more evenly over a twenty four 
hour period in order to increase efficient use of base-load power stations running on cheaper fuels 
compared to peak-load capacity.  
 
EE reduces the overall level of electricity consumption, thereby reducing sales. This is traditionally 
not considered to be in the best interest of utilities as they are accustomed to selling kilowatt-hours 
and their pricing regimes are designed accordingly (Davison, 1991: 26). EE initiatives, therefore, 
are often met with scepticism by power generators and usually require regulation if they are to be 
carried out effectively whilst maintaining the economic feasibility of the utility.  
 
In some circumstances, however, it can be more profitable for a utility to encourage EE rather than 
sell more kilowatt-hours. The parameters that determine these circumstances are the price at which 
a utility can sell its electricity for and the cost of investing in additional capacity to meet rising 
demand compared to the costs of EE initiatives.  The costs of investing in new generating capacity 
are generally very high; whilst the price of electricity is normally regulated and subject to political 
pressures that limit the extent to which it can be increased (Davison, 1991: 1).  The South African 
electricity sector is moving towards such a set of circumstances, which has resulted in a growing 
awareness of the advantages of EE in particular and DSM in general has to offer.   
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Energy efficiency in South Africa  
South Africa has a very energy intensive economy14. This is due to the historic development of the 
economy around mining and heavy industry based on the provision of cheap electricity produced 
using inexpensive, low-grade coal. The availability of cheap electricity and the traditional emphasis 
placed on supply-side management in the electricity sector has resulted in very little incentive for 
industry or private consumers to adopt measures to reduce electricity consumption. In the White 
Paper on Energy Policy of 1998 the government indicated that emphasis would be placed on DSM 
and the more efficient use of energy. This along with the need for new generating capacity in the 
near future and the impending increase in electricity prices has lead to the DME and the state utility 
affording the issue of EE greater importance than previously had been the case. This has resulted in 
initiatives by both the state and Eskom to introduce EE measures. The DME published its Energy 
Efficiency Strategy in March 2005, whilst Eskom has been running a DSM programme since 2003.  
 
Energy Efficiency Strategy 
The DME published its Energy Efficiency Strategy for the Republic of South Africa in March 2005. 
It sets a national target for energy savings of at least 12% by the end of February 2015. The target is 
based on the forecasted energy demand for a business-as-usual baseline scenario based on data for 
2000. The strategy is to be implemented in three phases, the first two running for three years each, 
whilst the final phase is forecasted to stretch over a four-year period. The intention of the strategy is 
to implement low-cost interventions with rapid payback in the initial phases, whilst higher-cost or 
more complex EE instruments will be instigated in the final phase.  
 
                                                 
14 The energy intensity of an economy is an expression of the amount of energy consumed per unit of economic output. 
In 2000 South Africa had an energy intensity of 3.51 PJ/billion Rand, which is higher than South Korea, China, India 
and the USA (ERC, 2004: 29 & EIA, 2004: 5). 
 66
0500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Year
PJ
Target Outcome to 2015
Projected Demand to 2015
 
Figure 1: Final Energy Demand – Target Outcome to 2015 (DME, 2005a: 13) 
 
The national target has been divided between the various key demand sectors. The industry and 
mining sector, power generation and the commercial and public building sector have all been given 
a demand reduction target of 15%, whilst the residential sector and transport sector have received 
targets of 10% and 9% respectively. These targets are considered to be conservative by the DME as 
it feels it important that targets are seen as challenging yet achievable (DME, 2005: 14). The targets 
have been deduced using research into technical interventions only, but the strategy does emphasise 
the importance of non-technical opportunities for energy savings such as energy management and 
increased awareness.  
 
The strategy paper tables eight goals to be achieved through the implementation of EE. These goals 
are intended to represent the contribution EE can make to the socio-economic commitments the 
government has made.  
 
Table 4.1: Goals and outcomes for energy efficiency strategy (DME, 2005a: 16) 
Goals Outcomes 
1. Improve the health of the nation Health benefits through reduced atmospheric pollution and improved living 
conditions, reduction in respiratory illnesses. 
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2. Job creation Long-term employment opportunities increased by reducing costs in industry and 
commerce. 
Employment opportunities increased within the EE sector and related activities. 
3. Energy poverty alleviation Access to affordable energy services by promoting low energy alternatives. 
Lower energy costs for households by improving domestic energy efficiency. 
4. Reduced local pollution Atmospheric pollutant levels reduced by reduction in fossil fuel combustion in 
power stations, industry, commerce and transport. 
5. Reduce CO2 emissions National CO2 emissions reduced by improving EE across all economic sectors. 
6. Improve industrial 
competitiveness 
Improve profitability by minimising energy overheads. 
Improve international image of South African products by minimising 
environmental impacts. 
7. Increase energy security Increased resilience to fluctuations in international energy prices. 
Increased resilience to internal supply disruptions by reducing load demands.  
8. Defer additional capacity Construction of new generating capacity deferred by reducing peak load 
requirements. 
 
 
Sector Programmes 
The DME has tabled a planned programme of intervention to achieve the reduction target for 
various consumer sectors in the EE strategy. These will form the basis of more detailed 
implementation plans that are to be developed for each sector at a later date. A summary of the 
objectives and approaches to EE in each sector is given in the table below. There is no summary for 
the power-generating sector in the EE strategy, whilst the strategy for the transport sector has been 
omitted, as this project will only concentrate on EE relating to electricity.  
 
Table 2: Objectives and approaches for implementation of EE strategy (based on DME, 2005a: 27-32) 
Sector programme Core objectives Approach 
Industry and mining To decouple increases in industrial 
output from increases in energy 
consumption. 
 
To bring the energy intensity of 
industrial sectors into line with 
international standards and best 
practice.  
‘Leadership by demonstration’ 
programmes will be implemented 
whereby voluntary initiatives from 
industry will be used to build capacity 
in energy management and provide 
incentives for replication nationwide. 
Donor funding may be utilised to 
finance some of these projects. 
Mandatory technical standards will be 
implemented in phases for horizontal 
technologies15. 
Obligations to carry out energy audits 
within energy intensive industries. 
                                                 
15 Horizontal technologies refers to technology that is common to many types of industries such as electrical motors, 
industrial boilers etc.  
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Maximise EE investments into cash 
benefits for industry through the 
CDM.  
Promotion of ESCOs. 
Information on available EE 
technologies. 
Commercial and public sector 
buildings 
To demonstrate the government’s 
commitment to EE by implementation 
in public buildings. 
 
To upgrade the energy performance 
of existing public and commercial 
buildings. 
 
To achieve best practice energy 
performance in new public and 
commercial buildings. 
Government will raise EE awareness 
and implement EE measures in 
government buildings. 
Mandatory EE standards will be 
introduced as will energy auditing. 
EE will be incorporated into building 
design and EE technologies 
introduced into existing buildings. 
Energy management systems for 
buildings will be demonstrated and 
promoted. 
Energy labels for appliances will be 
introduced. 
SANS 20416 will be incorporated into 
the National Building Regulations.  
Residential sector  To combat the negative health 
impacts of pollution. 
To mitigate the effects of peak 
demand on capacity. 
 
To introduce standards for housing 
and energy labelling for household 
appliances. 
 
Introduction of state-of-the-art 
technologies. 
Awareness programmes promoting 
the benefits of EE in the home. 
Introduction of appliance labelling. 
Demonstration projects to create 
awareness and incentives for EE 
implementation. 
Aimed at higher income homes and 
state subsidised housing incorporating 
EE measures as a standard feature. 
SANS 28317 will be incorporated into 
the National Building Regulations. 
 
 
Implementation of the energy efficiency strategy 
This section intends to highlight the progress made so far on the implementation of the EE strategy 
and how the implementation process is proceeding.  
 
The EE strategy was launched at the beginning of the annual Energy Efficiency Month in May 
2005. The EE Month runs until the end of August and is intended to raise awareness amongst the 
general public and business of the opportunities EE provides for reducing energy expenditure in the 
home and the workplace.  
 
                                                 
16 SANS 204 is a building standard for energy efficiency in air-conditioned commercial buildings  
17 SANS 283 is a building standard for energy efficient housing 
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To date the government has introduced energy saving devices into four public buildings, which will 
result in annual savings of R640, 000 (DME, 2005c). This is intended to show the government’s 
commitment to EE and its intention to lead the way in implementing energy saving interventions. 
35 other government buildings are in the process of being retrofitted to increase EE and a few 
private companies have also implemented energy saving devices (Eskom, 2005).  
 
The DME and representatives of industry have signed the Energy Efficiency Accord (see annex B), 
which is an agreement to establish a mutually beneficial framework for voluntary EE initiatives that 
will achieve the goals of attracting investment in CDM projects and efficient energy use (DME, 
2005b: 1). Parties to the EE Accord agree to pursue the national EE targets on a voluntary basis as 
well as collaborate on initiatives that could result in CDM projects being established. The accord 
recognises that EE initiatives have to be considered within the context of the national imperative to 
achieve higher economic growth.  
 
Appliance labelling for refrigerators has been introduced in South Africa. It is intended that all 
refrigerators be graded according to their electricity consumption on a scale from A to G where A is 
the most efficient and G the least efficient. This system is identical to that, which has been used in 
the E.U. with great success. The label must appear in the manual of all refrigerators sold in South 
Africa and the DME expects that this will be the case by the end of 2005. There are also plans to 
extend appliance labelling to freezers, front-load washing machines, electrical stoves and tumble 
dryers in the future.  
 
The DME has produced an EE label for South Africa, which is intended to raise awareness of EE 
amongst the general public and to indicate whether a product or manufacturer complies with the 
principles of EE. The South African Bureau of Standards intends to include the label in its 
certification process, but this will take about 18 months to implement. 
 
The Efficient Lighting Initiative (ELI) ran from January 2000 to March 2003 and was implemented 
by the International Finance Corporation and funded by Eskom and GEF. The aim of the 
programme was to accelerate the penetration of EE lighting technologies in South Africa in order 
reduce GHG emissions as well as lessen peak load demands from the residential sector. The ELI 
programme managed to increase the awareness and use of EE light bulbs in both the residential and 
 70
commercial sector and achieved its goal of creating a sustainable market for EE lighting in South 
Africa (ELI, 2004: 12). The ELI will continue as a part of Eskom’s DSM programme for the 
residential sector. This is an important issue for the utility as residential demand profiles have very 
high peaks relative to base load. Even though residential consumption accounts for only about 15% 
of total electricity consumption it constitutes 75% of the variable national load (Van Horen et al, 
1998: 8). This pattern requires a more expensive generating capacity mix in order to cope with the 
large disparity between peak and base load. With the number of residential consumers steadily 
increasing and the projected economic growth in the country improving income levels the demand 
from the residential sector is expected to increase steadily, which may further exacerbate the 
problem of covering peak demand. 
 
Eskom provides economic assistance for participants in DSM projects. EE projects may be fully 
financed by Eskom, but the customer benefiting from the project is required to contribute half of the 
total capital costs. This contribution may be a one-off payment or in equal instalments including 
interest over the contract period. Load management DSM projects are 100% financed by Eskom 
with the customer not being obliged to make a contribution. Eskom is also finances a portion of 
DSM energy audits, though not exceeding 80% of total costs. Eskom also encouraging the 
establishment of energy service companies (ESCOs) by offering training programmes for aspirant 
ESCOs. This will increase the capacity for carrying out energy audits and implementing electricity 
saving initiatives in industry.  
 
The South African Institute of Mechanical Engineers has launched an initiative for energy savings 
through more effective electric pumps. The aim of the initiative is to inform industrial pump users 
of the benefits of basing pump purchasing and operating decisions on life cycle costing rather than 
upfront capital expenditure (Engineering News, 10/6/2005). This initiative is in line with the EE 
Accord.  
 
It is the intention of the DME to launch the South African National Energy Research Institute 
(SANERI) during the course of 2005 in a joint project with the Department of Science and 
Technology. SANERI will be a subsidiary of the Central Energy Fund (CEF) and will be funded 
through the Science Council Vote. R20 million has been allocated to SANERI for 2005/2006 
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increasing to R40 million the following year. EE is included in the research strategy of SANERI, 
which will focus on the development of innovative products and strategies that promote EE.  
 
CEF has established the Energy Development Corporation (EDC), which is mandated to support the 
development and commercialisation of projects that promote sustainable development. EE projects 
that have been identified by EDC for future development are solar water heaters, solar cookers and 
a potential partnership with the lighting company OSRAM in an EE initiative involving the 
distribution of five million CFLs. OSRAM has previously been involved with Eskom DSM in a 
promotional drive for the sale of CFLs during 2004. The campaign offered prizes and give-aways 
for customers purchasing OSRAM CFLs and resulted in a 147% increase in annual sales of the 
more efficient light bulb (http://www.osram.co.za/news/press/2005/cflcampaign.htm). 
 
Comments on the Energy Efficiency Strategy 
The EE strategy in South Africa must be considered in the context of the government’s priorities as 
well as the fact that South Africa is a developing country that has very little experience in EE. This 
being the case the state utility is one of the largest in the world and has shown impressive financial 
results since become a corporation, whilst South African industry is well established and is a player 
on the world market.  
 
The EE strategy is a step in the right direction for the energy sector in South Africa, but it is not as 
ambitious as it claims to be. The areas of concern are an apparent lack of willingness to regulate on 
EE, a reliance on funding through the CDM and foreign donors, too little focus being placed on 
improving efficiency throughout the entire electricity sector, reliance on a voluntary approach from 
industry and overlooking the job opportunities that lie in EE implementation.  
 
The DME has shown a lack of willingness to regulate on EE issues. Both the former Minister for 
Minerals and Energy, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka18, and the Chief Director for Energy Planning in 
the DME, Kevin Nassiep, have indicated that the DME does not intend introducing regulation at 
this stage in the hope that this will allow for EE measures to benefit from the CDM (Engineering 
News, 9/11/2004 & DNA Workshop, 1/12/2004). When one considers the EE strategy it is difficult 
                                                 
18 Mlambo-Ngcuka is now deputy president while Benedicta Lindiwe Hendricks was appointed Minister for Minerals & 
Energy in June 2005.  
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to see where the CDM is expected to play a role. The issue of additionality or difficulties in 
determining baselines will disqualify most of the initiatives mentioned in the strategy whether they 
are regulated on or not. The role of the CDM is very limited when addressing the simple task of no 
cost or low-cost energy savings in South Africa, which the EE strategy in reality presents. The 
CDM is designed to assist projects that are more expensive and innovative than those proposed in 
the initial phases of the EE strategy and it is, therefore, unlikely that emission reductions from such 
no cost and low-cost EE projects would be considered additional.  
 
The EE strategy does, however, indicate that regulation may be introduced if the uptake of EE does 
not meet the requirements for achieving the national target.  How and when it will be determined 
whether the uptake of EE is satisfactory and the criteria used in order to do this are not divulged in 
the strategy. Presumably the implementation progress will be assessed at the end of each phase. 
This requires the drawing up of targets for each phase in order to determine whether progress is 
satisfactory and if the strategy is on course for meeting the final target. The DME expresses its 
concern about introducing regulation that it cannot enforce in the EE strategy due to a lack of 
capacity. This is problematic for achieving the goals of the strategy, but there are programmes 
underway for improving the institutional capacity of the DME, which will hopefully assist the 
department in enforcing the policy it produces.  
 
The EE strategy sets a target of 15% savings in the electricity sector itself, but there is no strategy 
for implementing this target. It was not possible to ascertain the reason for this. According to the 
NER (2005: 7) 4,020 GWh were consumed by the electricity sector, mostly for pumped storage in 
2003. This represented an increase of 42% from 2002, which is most likely due to the sharp 
increase in peak demand that is occurring in South Africa. There are substantial electricity losses in 
the distribution network in South Africa. The upgrading of facilities could play a major role in not 
only increasing efficiency but also ensuring the future supply of electricity to consumers. The 
number of power failures in South Africa has been increasing over the last decade and many of 
these blackouts have been attributed to aging distribution lines19. In 2000 the overall losses in the 
distribution system were 23.2%, which is high considering that modern, well maintained 
distribution networks have average losses of about 3.5%. The losses experienced in South Africa 
                                                 
19 There have, however, been claims that some of the power failures experienced have been due to load shedding by 
Eskom as they no longer are able to cope with the demand for electricity and have not shown due diligence in assessing 
and planning for the electricity demand (Namibian Economist, 18/6/2004). 
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are mostly due to old, poorly maintained transformers and long, thin distribution lines (Brebøl et. 
al., 2003: 26). The power generation sector has been given a target of a 15% reduction in electricity 
use, but the EE strategy does not include a sector programme for implementing this goal. The 
reason for this is unclear and no figures could be found on the electricity consumption and potential 
savings in the power generation sector though it can be assumed they may be significant judging by 
the size of the target.   
 
The EE strategy relies on a voluntary approach in order to achieve its goals. This may be difficult to 
achieve considering the low price of electricity in South Africa. The low prices do not provide the 
necessary incentive for EE initiatives to be taken by commercial and industrial customers, as energy 
is a minor input cost compared with labour and raw materials. Information campaigns and pilot 
projects can provide industrial consumers with the incentive to reconsider their energy use, but 
price is generally the prime motivator for voluntary EE initiatives. The main incentives to enter into 
voluntary agreements for industries are to avoid regulation, gain goodwill from customers and allow 
flexibility in achieving targets in a manner that suites their economic circumstances, whilst 
governments can achieve early, cooperative implementation of policies. Voluntary agreements have 
the advantage that they encourage industry to set and meet energy and environmental targets, whilst 
increasing the profile of environmental and social issues in corporate decision-making, however 
they have met with limited success. A study of voluntary agreements in five countries came to the 
conclusion that their effectiveness is reliant on a supporting framework of policy and regulation, 
which should be adapted to the target group envisioned (EDRC, 2003: 78). One of the largest recent 
voluntary agreements in South Africa was the Johannesburg Climate Legacy Programme. This 
involved offsetting the emissions from the World Summit on Sustainable Development by 
supporting local sustainable development and emission reduction projects. Despite the agreement 
prior to the World Summit the funding collected was insufficient to cover a fifth of the emissions 
(EDRC, 2003: 78).  
 
The DME does not intend to put a supporting framework in place for the EE strategy as has been 
discussed earlier, but has included sector policies that indicate the types of interventions it 
envisages, though these are very general. Whether this is enough to encourage the voluntary uptake 
of EE in the private sector is questionable, but together with a desire for goodwill from the 
 74
government and the general public as well as apprehension about environmental concerns in 
overseas markets it may lead to some progress.  
 
The situation may well change in the near future due to the growing need for new generating 
capacity in South Africa. Eskom will be required to make substantial investments in new generating 
capacity within the next ten to fifteen years in order to maintain a stable supply of electricity in 
South Africa. The growing urgency for new investment in generating capacity is indeed the major 
driving force behind both Eskom’s and the government’s initiatives on DSM and EE. The irony of 
the situation is that a voluntary EE strategy will most likely only become effective once the 
electricity price has increased due to new investments in generating capacity, which is precisely 
what the EE strategy is hoping to delay. 
One of the government’s prime concerns is the very high unemployment level in South Africa. This 
concern is a major driver for the implementation of policy by the South African government. It is, 
therefore, surprising that the DME does not place greater emphasis on the creation of jobs through 
EE. The strategy lists the creation of jobs as one of the overall goals of implementing EE in South 
Africa but does not elaborate on the extent to which this is possible, nor does it mention that job 
creation for a given investment in EE is usually higher than for an equal supply-side investment 
(Olesen, 2001: 3).  
In a study presented at the workshop, “Reducing greenhouse gas emissions and encouraging 
development” (11/11/2004) it was shown that an investment-led EE scenario based on the 
electricity and economic profile of the South African economy in 1997 could result in the net 
creation of 38,800 jobs (Laitner, 2004: 15). This figure is based on an estimated investment required 
to achieve a 5% efficiency gain in electricity consumption by 2010 starting in 2002 assuming an 
average seven-year payback time on various EE investments. A seven-year payback time is much 
longer than those envisaged in the EE strategy, which is based mostly on no-cost and low-cost 
interventions with payback periods of three years or less rather than investment-led EE.  
 
This could raise doubts as to whether the EE strategy will lead to a net job gain during its 
implementation period. In fact some concerns have been raised as to whether relying on no cost and 
low-cost interventions may result in jobs losses (Botha, 11/6/2004). This concern is due to the 
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failure to distinguish between EE and economic efficiency in the strategy. 20 Despite this studies in 
the U.S. have indicated that less than 10% of the net jobs created due to EE are associated with 
direct investment in efficiency measures whilst more than 90% are due to spending and investment 
of energy bill savings (Geller et al, 1992: 1). This appears to suggest that the EE strategy has the 
potential to create a number of jobs in South Africa through the economic savings achieved leading 
to increased spending by implementers of EE. The EE strategy should emphasise this potential 
more in order to achieve increased interest and support for EE from other government departments 
and the cabinet.  
 
Summary 
The DME has published an EE strategy with the aim of reducing energy consumption by 12% by 
2015. The strategy does not map out a clear pathway for achieving this goal and relies heavily on a 
voluntary agreement with industry to initiate the required savings and foreign investments through 
the CDM and donor funds. These are unlikely to materialise to the extent the government hopes, 
which may lead to the EE strategy not achieving its goals.  
 
Eskom is currently involved in a DSM programme, which focuses mostly on load shifting rather 
than electricity conservation. The scheme does provide funding for participants and aims to displace 
152 MW of generating capacity annually for ten years between 2003 and 2013. This is relatively 
small compared to the total size of Eskom’s electricity generating capacity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 EE is an approach to energy consumption, which emphasises maximum output from minimum energy input whilst 
economic efficiency is a different concept, referring to the optimal allocation of resources derived from the intersection 
of marginal cost and benefit. This can lead to a situation where it can be economically efficient to use more energy if it 
is cheap (ERC, 2004: 29). 
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Barriers for integrating the CDM into the energy efficiency 
strategy 
The aim of this chapter is to identify the barriers for the integration of the CDM into the EE 
strategy. The identification of barriers is important in order to determine where potential stumbling 
blocks exist for implementing EE as well as CDM projects and how they can either be overcome or 
taken account for in the implementation process. This chapter is divided into two sub-sections 
describing the barriers for implementing the EE strategy and the barriers for using the CDM in 
South Africa.   
 
Barriers for implementing the energy efficiency strategy 
This section describes the barriers identified in the status chapters for implementing the EE strategy 
in South Africa. This will assist in determining whether the CDM can be used to create an enabling 
environment for introducing EE initiatives in South Africa.  
 
Lack of institutional capacity   
There is a lack of institutional capacity in the DME for implementing an EE strategy. This is a 
barrier for creating an enabling environment for EE, as the DME is not in a position to enforce 
regulation. This is due to a lack of human and financial resources for monitoring and enforcing 
compliance with the EE strategy in all sectors.  
 
The DME is attempting to overcome this by utilising a voluntary approach for industry. This is a 
possible solution for overcoming the problem of enforcement and monitoring, but it requires a 
strong agreement between the state and industry. This is not the case in South Africa as the 
agreement that has been entered into is more a memorandum of understanding than a contract. This 
is an indication of the lack of capacity in composing the agreement as well as a lack of influence to 
impose EE on industry as a whole. This is aggravated by the fact that there does not appear to be 
consensus in the DME on the benefits of EE for the economy as a whole as there are fears that EE 
may lead to job losses in the mining and electricity sector.  
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The lack of institutional capacity in the DME and the NER for implementing EE is illustrated by the 
exclusion of EE from the IEP and the very minor role DSM plays in the NIRP. These blueprints for 
the future of the South African electricity sector are an indication that the DME is either not capable 
or unable to enforcing its policy on the electricity sector. The DME has developed policy for the 
introduction of RE as well as the EE strategy, but did not include them in the IEP or instruct the 
NER to include them in the NIRP. This is probably due to the lack of political influence the DME 
has as well as a lack of resources and human capacity. 
 
The lack of human capacity is being addressed through initiatives such as the CABEERE 
programme, but it remains problematic that there is neither the necessary capacity to carry out the 
policy developed nor the political influence and will in the DME to implement the EE strategy 
effectively.   
 
Tariff methodology and split incentives 
Split incentives refer to a situation whereby there are contradictory incentives in a system for 
stakeholders not to implement policy. In other words that regulation in a system rewards opposing 
actions. In the case of electricity suppliers in South Africa the methodology for determining 
electricity tariffs creates a split incentive. This is due to the fact that rate of return does not 
encourage utilities to become more efficient, provides no incentive for technological innovation and 
acts as a barrier for EE as it does not provide the utility with the necessary incentives for 
encouraging efficiency in its customer base. On the other hand the rate of return encourages utilities 
to underestimate demand growths as this can lead to increased returns. The result of this can be seen 
in the way the South African electricity system has developed with what appeared to be a sudden 
and unexpected increase in demand that has put immense pressure on the system. Despite this 
Eskom has insisted for a number of years now that growth has been steady at 2.5%. This could be a 
result of a previous lack of a claw back clause in the RoR methodology, which provides an 
incentive to underestimate growth in demand. Even though a claw back clause has now been 
introduced it may still allow Eskom to retain 50% of the increases in revenue due to increased 
efficiency and higher demand. This undermines the RoR as it provides added incentives to over 
capitalise and underestimate demand.  
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The split incentive arises due to the coupling of a DSM requirement to tariff regulation. The NER 
requires Eskom to displace the equivalent of 152 MW of generating capacity annually. The RoR 
encourages underestimating demand, which could lead to overestimations of increases in efficiency. 
This system encourages load shifting rather than EE. This is mirrored in Eskom’s DSM programme, 
which is based mostly on shifting peak demand rather than actual energy savings. It is not in 
Eskom’s economic interests to effect real savings amongst its largest clients as this will negatively 
effect Eskom’s income due to RoR methodology used in tariff determination.   
 
The split incentive can be remedied by introducing a tariff structure that decouples the correlation 
between a utilities earnings and volume of sales. This will encourage a utility to reduce the amount 
of units produced, as EE will not affect the real earnings of power generators.                             
 
Low electricity prices and lack of awareness 
The low electricity prices and a tradition of supply side management in South Africa have lead to a 
culture of high electricity consumption and a lack of awareness of EE in all sectors. This acts as a 
barrier for implementing the EE strategy on two fronts. Firstly the low electricity price leads to 
longer payback times on investments in EE, which acts as a deterrent for industry and private 
households to invest in such initiatives and secondly the lack of awareness of the advantages of EE 
make it more difficult for EE programmes to be initiated successfully.    
 
The fact that electricity prices are expected to rise steadily in the future due to the introduction of 
new generating capacity will increase awareness of the advantages of EE, as well as reduce payback 
times on investments in EE initiatives. The problem with this in the South African context is that 
one of the three key challenges of the electricity system, reduction of energy poverty, is reliant on 
low electricity prices. Low-income households in particular will be affected by an increase in 
electricity prices as they lack the capital resources to invest in energy saving devices that will lower 
bills but cannot afford to pay increasing electricity prices. This leads to a situation where low-
income households must do without electricity rather than investing in ways to utilise less 
electricity better. High-income households and industry, however, generally have the capital to 
invest in EE, but prices have to rise significantly to make it economically attractive to do so. This 
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magnifies the negative effect of increasing electricity prices for low-income households (Timney, 
2004: 124).  
 
There are two methods of tackling this problem. The first is to cross-subsidise electricity prices and 
the other is to regulate industry and the private sector to enforce EE in order to reduce investments 
in new generating capacity and thereby reduce the level of price increases. The second option has 
greater benefits for all consumers as increasing electricity prices have an inflationary effect 
throughout the economy. Price increases can also be introduced in a manner that has minimal effect 
on low-income households yet still encourages EE throughout the system. Inverted block tariffs are 
a form of pricing that has higher cost tiers as consumption increases. This sends a signal to 
consumers to conserve electricity whilst reducing the effects of necessary price increases on the 
poor. 
 
Summary 
The barriers described in the section above all present a challenge for the DME to overcome if the 
EE strategy is to be implemented successfully. The fact that the lack of institutional capacity is 
being addressed by the DME is the first step in overcoming all the barriers mentioned. Once the 
capacity of the government and the NER is improved so the remaining barriers can be addressed 
more successfully. This requires time but is well within the timeframe of this project. It can 
therefore be concluded that the barriers to implementing the EE strategy can be overcome. This 
leads to a consideration of the barriers for utilising the CDM in South Africa.   
 
Barriers for utilising the CDM in South Africa 
This sub-section will be divided into three parts. The first will describe the barriers for 
implementing the CDM at the international level; the second will describe the barriers at the 
institutional level and the third barriers at the project level.  
 
Barriers at the international level 
There are some barriers for implementing CDM activities at the international level, which will be 
considered in this section.  
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Uncertainty over future of the CDM 
The future of international climate politics after the first commitment period ends in 2012 is 
uncertain at present. There have been no indications that binding emission reduction targets will be 
extended after 2012. This could mean that CERs may loose their value after this time. There is 
currently almost no demand for CERs after 2012, which reduces the scope for development of 
CDM projects with long lead times (CDM-ASEAN, 2004: 11).  
 
The uncertainty surrounding the future of the CDM and the value of CERs is a barrier to the 
development of CDM activities as most projects will have a lifetime past 2012 and, therefore, face a 
certain amount of risk when calculating income from CERs after this point. This may lead to some 
CDM activities becoming less attractive for potential investors especially in countries where the 
processing time for project approval from the DNA and other necessary permits and permission 
from government tend to be drawn out.  
 
Negotiations have begun on how international climate politics will develop after 2012 and many 
believe that a system similar to the CDM will continue after the first commitment period. Even if 
there are no binding commitments for CO2 reductions it is likely that there will remain a market for 
CERs after this date. The EU has indicated through the European Trading Scheme that it is intent on 
implementing GHG emission policies unilaterally in order to address the problem of climate 
change. This has become a prestige project for the EU and it is likely that member states will have 
to meet some kind of emission reduction targets post-Kyoto whether there are binding international 
targets or not. This will maintain a market for CERs after 2012 even though it may be reduced if 
Japan and Canada no longer have binding reduction targets.  
 
Difficulty of monitoring energy efficiency projects 
EE projects have not made an impact on the CDM regime (see annex A) due to the difficulty in 
monitoring reductions in GHG emissions for these project types, which is a barrier for the 
integration of CDM into the EE strategy in South Africa. A possible solution to the difficulties that 
EE projects have with monitoring reductions in GHGs is the approval of CDM projects involving 
the combined reductions of a sector rather than of individual projects. The advantage of doing this 
is that it is easier to measure the total reductions in a sector than it is for a single project. This can 
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be done through the electricity supply industry as data on consumption by sector is gathered for 
national statistics in many countries already, South Africa included.  
 
The question is whether the EB will approve sector initiatives. The CDM was originally intended as 
a project based mechanism so there is a feeling that a final decision on this issue may have to be 
taken by the MOP. If such projects are approved it will open the door for EE projects to be initiated 
on a greater scale in the CDM.  
 
Barriers at the institutional level 
This section will look at barriers at the institutional level in South Africa. 
 
Overestimation of potential of CDM 
 There is a tendency in South Africa to overestimate the possibilities in the CDM for implementing 
the EE strategy. This has resulted in the DME announcing that it will not regulate on EE in the hope 
that CDM activities will take the initiative. This acts as a barrier for implementing CDM projects as 
false expectations of the CDM are created, which could well lead to disillusionment with the 
mechanism. The reality of the situation is that CDM can only play a small role in achieving the 
goals of the EE strategy and, therefore, should not be allowed to dictate the policy of the DME. This 
is presently the case with the DME making it clear that it will not regulate on EE for fear of 
reducing the number of CDM projects in the country. The CDM should be seen as a possibility for 
reducing the costs of introducing pilot projects in new EE technologies and through this assessing 
the potential for a technology to be introduced in certain sectors. The CDM could be used as a 
precursor for establishing voluntary agreements with industry on EE.  
 
Even though the potential of the CDM is generally over exaggerated in South Africa the mechanism 
has raised awareness in industry of EE and the potential for financial savings through increased 
energy conservation. There is, however, a tendency to believe that the CDM can lead to greater 
returns on investments in EE. This leads us to the next institutional barrier for CDM. 
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Understanding of additionality requirement 
There appears to be a lack of understanding of the concept of additionality in South Africa. The 
belief that CDM adds value to investments in EE technologies is widespread and mirrored in the 
DME’s reasoning for not regulating on issues such as EE. The CDM cannot be used for investments 
that would have occurred in the absence of the mechanism. The EB has set precedence through its 
rejection of methodologies and projects that are financially viable without the additional income 
from the CDM. This should be taken seriously as the rejection of projects as CDM activities will 
most likely lead to disillusionment with the mechanism and a lost opportunity for using the CDM 
for the greater benefit of South Africa.  
 
In order to overcome this barrier the government should encourage EE projects that can utilise 
existing methodologies of which there are four large-scale and six small-scale pertaining to EE. As 
more methodologies are approved so the scope of potential EE CDM projects will increase. This 
plan of action can help overcome the problem of differing interpretations of additionality.  
 
Barriers at the project level 
 There are barriers at the project level for implementing CDM activities that have been identified 
through this report. These are described below. 
 
Low electricity price and high transaction costs 
The low price for electricity is a barrier for CDM activities involving EE in South Africa. A low 
electricity price not only reduces the incentive for carrying out EE projects, but it also makes it 
difficult for CDM activities involving EE to cover the expense of implementation due to the higher 
transaction costs involved with registering a CDM project. The low electricity price in South Africa 
may restrict EE CDM activities to larger industrial projects where the mechanism can be a 
supporting measure. For smaller projects in the domestic and commercial sector the low electricity 
price and high transaction costs will lead to a situation where the CDM only has a marginal impact 
(Varming, 2005: 9).  
 
The bundling of small-scale projects, a sector approach and the use of existing methodologies will 
help reduce the transaction costs of EE CDM activities. Electricity prices are also expected to rise 
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steadily over the short-term, which should be included in calculations for CDM projects. This will 
assist in overcoming this barrier as will the introduction of a South African DOE. Price Waterhouse 
and Cooper of South Africa have applied to the EB to become a DOE and are currently under 
review. If they are successful in their application this may well assist in lowering transaction costs 
for CDM activities in South Africa as payments to the DOE could be made at local rates. 
 
Lack of experience amongst project developers 
Due to the fact that the CDM is a new mechanism for project development there is only a small 
pool of experience in managing these types of projects. This makes it difficult to find with the 
knowledge and experience to develop CDM activities efficiently and with a reduced risk of the 
project not leading to the production of CERs.  
 
This is an international problem but will be reduced as experience with the CDM increases and 
more and more projects are developed. As the mechanism matures so will experience with 
developing CDM activities increase. The DNA in South Africa can also play a role by assisting 
potential project developers widen their knowledge of the CDM by running workshops on the 
subject and by encouraging NGOs and non-profit organisations to share their experiences.  
 
Summary 
There are barriers facing the integration of the CDM into an energy efficiency strategy in South 
Africa, but they can be overcome or will diminish as the CDM matures as a project-based 
mechanism. No barriers identified during the course of this project act as stoppers for the 
integration of the CDM into the EE strategy. It is possible to move ahead and determine how the 
CDM can be integrated into the EE strategy in order to assist the government achieve its goals in 
electricity conservation. This will be the topic of the next chapter. 
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Integration of the CDM into Energy Planning 
Having discussed the barriers for the CDM and EE, as well as ways of overcoming these hurdles in 
the previous chapter it is possible to consider how CDM can play a role in planning using the EE 
strategy. The aim of this chapter is to identify how the CDM can be used in energy planning and the 
manner in which it can be implemented by the South African government in order to derive benefit 
for the entire system and not just project developers and purchasers of CERs.  
 
This chapter will consider how the CDM can be used in planning in a manner that promotes 
development and leads to the testing and promotion of new technologies and techniques in South 
Africa. The aim of this section is to indicate how South Africa can utilise the CDM to its own 
advantage and ensure that it leads to development in certain sectors rather than simply resulting in 
end-pipe solutions with little benefit for the host country. 
 
Integrating the CDM into the EE strategy 
The aim of this section is to show how South Africa can utilise the CDM in energy planning in 
order to benefit from the mechanism in a manner that helps the government achieve the goals set 
out in the EE strategy. As it has already been ascertained that the CDM can only play a small role in 
the EE strategy it is essential that the projects that are developed can be used in moving the 
electricity system towards a more efficient, and therefore sustainable, future. This can be achieved 
by using the CDM to identify technologies that can later be implemented into EE regulation in 
South Africa. This gives the government an opportunity to determine a course of action for future 
initiatives in EE whilst actively implementing the initial phases of the EE strategy. As the DME has 
already divided implementation of the EE into three phases it makes sense that CDM play the role 
of initiating the third phase whilst the first two phases are being implemented. The first two phases 
of the EE strategy are intended to include low cost and no cost initiatives. This will most likely 
exclude them from being additional and, therefore, the role of CDM in the initial phases will most 
likely be limited. This will not only ensure the additionality of the CDM activities but also allow 
progressive sectors in industry to benefit from their initiatives in improving efficiency and assisting 
the government achieve its target for EE as well as moving the country towards a more sustainable 
future.  
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The CDM should be used as a mechanism for funding pilot projects in order to determine the 
effects of new technologies on the electricity system as well as on the performance of the host 
sector. In this way the DME will be able to determine the advantages of introducing the technology 
through regulation or through voluntary agreements, whilst also being able to document the 
advantages for stakeholders to implement the energy efficient technology. This is illustrated in the 
figure 7.1 below. The figure indicates that the CDM can be used for instigating pilot projects 
inspired by the current EE strategy and that the experiences from these pilot projects can be used in 
the formulation of the next phase of the EE strategy. The government can utilise the CDM in this 
way to achieve the targets it has set for itself and guide the electricity system towards a more 
sustainable future through the introduction of cleaner technologies using the CDM as a catalyst for 
instigating pilot projects in order to test the appropriateness of such technologies in the South 
African context.   
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ure 7.1: Illustration of how CDM can be utilised in EE strategy  
order to do this there have to be institutions that actively promote the use of the CDM and help 
ntify potential CDM activities that can fulfil the role identified for the CDM as well as involving 
erested parties in the process. This will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
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Institutions to promote the CDM in South Africa 
In order that the South African government derive benefit from the CDM it is important that it 
designate institutions that can play the role of identifying and promoting projects that can assist in 
achieving the development goals of the state in the field of EE. The institutions that should carry out 
this role are the promotions sub-committee under the DNA, the DNA itself, the DME and Eskom.  
 
The Promotions sub-committee 
The structure of the DNA includes a promotions sub-committee. This committee should act 
independently of the DNA so as to maintain transparency in the approval process undertaken by the 
DNA. The sub-committee should maintain its current structure but also include representatives from 
NGOs and industry in order to allow for more stakeholders to participate in the process of 
identifying projects that can contribute to a more sustainable consumption of electricity in South 
Africa. The aim of the sub-committee would be to identify interested parties in the various 
electricity consumer sectors that are interested in implementing energy efficient technologies that 
can qualify as CDM activities. This could be done through a bidding process whereby interested 
parties put in tenders to qualify for the CDM pilot project scheme. The most important criteria for 
accepting bids should be their ability to qualify as a CDM activity, their contribution to achieving 
the development goals of the government in the form of EE savings in this case and the possibility 
for replicating the project in the applicable sector. This will give the DME the opportunity to 
consider the results of such a project for implementing EE standards in the relevant sector in the 
third phase of the EE strategy or at a later date.  
 
The sub-committee should also have the responsibility of promoting the CDM in private and state-
owned industry as well as evaluating the bids for participating in the scheme as an approved CDM 
activity. The CDM could be promoted through holding workshops designed to inform interested 
parties of the opportunities in the CDM as well as the way in which the bidding system functions 
and the criteria the sub-committee want fulfilled. 
 
Eskom 
Eskom should be given responsibility for assisting in implementing CDM activities under the 
scheme. The government should utilise the fact that Eskom has both the economic and human 
resources to play a more active role in promoting sustainable development in South Africa. The 
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government has already shelved its plans for liberalising the electricity sector and has, therefore, 
guaranteed Eskom’s position as the state-owned monopoly. This should give the government the 
power to insist that Eskom support relevant projects resulting in general public benefit.  
 
Eskom is already involved in a DSM programme where it offers 100% financing for load shifting 
projects and 50% financing for EE initiatives. This financial support programme should be extended 
to EE CDM projects approved by the promotions sub-committee due to the advantages these 
projects involve for promoting a more sustainable future for the country as well as delaying the 
need for Eskom to invest in new generating capacity.  
 
Eskom should also have the responsibility of managing a South African carbon fund along the lines 
of the DSM fund. This carbon fund could be used to invest in CDM projects as well as provide a 
forum for selling CERs to foreign buyers. This could reduce the transaction costs for individual 
projects in South Africa as it eliminates the need for each project to identify a purchaser of CERs 
and to draw up emission reduction purchasing agreements.  
 
Eskom is the state institution that has the most capacity in the electricity system and is, therefore, 
best equipped to assist in implementing EE initiatives as well as playing a role in utilising the CDM 
in an integrated fashion in order to extract maximum benefit for South Africa as a whole. Eskom 
can also play an important role by including the CDM in its training programme for ESCOs. This 
will give ESCOs the ability to identify potential CDM projects whilst carrying out energy audits.  
 
The DNA 
The DNA should have the responsibility of assessing the projects that tender to be implemented as 
CDM activities in order to advise the sub-committee and the bidders on the likely performance of 
the project against the approval criteria. This could result in the issuing of a letter of no objection 
from the DNA. All projects qualifying for a letter of no objection should be issued with one even if 
they do not qualify under the bidding system. This is due to the fact that the bidding system is not 
intended to stop CDM activities that fail to qualify but rather to promote projects that can 
specifically help the government achieve its development targets. The DNA should still encourage 
CDM activities undertaken independently of the sub-committee in order that the bidding system 
does not hinder other CDM activities.     
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 The DME 
The responsibility of the DME is to give guidelines to the sub-committee on the implementation of 
the third phase of the EE strategy. This should be done according to the sector plans developed in 
association with the EE strategy, which will provide the basis for determining the criteria for 
selecting projects in the tender process. The DME will also be required to enter into an agreement 
with Eskom as well as create an enabling environment in which the scheme can exist through 
legislation and regulation.  
 
The DME would also be responsible for determining whether the experiences gained from the CDM 
pilot project scheme can be utilised on a broader basis and implemented into voluntary agreements, 
regulation or the formation of EE standards. This would require that all information on the project 
be available to the DME and that the process occurs in an open and transparent forum.    
 
The CDM Pilot Project Scheme 
This section is intended to create a clear picture of how the CDM pilot project scheme can be 
implemented in South Africa and integrated into the EE strategy. This is based on the previous two 
sub-sections on how the CDM can be utilised in planning and which actors should play a role in the 
scheme. The scheme is illustrated in figure 7.2 below. 
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promoting the proposed projects by attempting to couple parties interested in investing in CDM 
activities in South Africa if such an interest exists.  
 
Once the successful tenders have been identified Eskom and the project developer should determine 
how the project will be financed and what role Eskom will play in developing the project. Eskom 
should finance projects up to a maximum of 50%. This funding should be provided in the same 
manner as for DSM projects and the EE CDM projects should fall under Eskom’s DSM 
programme.  
 
The CDM pilot project scheme could also fall under a South African carbon fund that sells CERs 
produced from South African projects to international buyers. Funds already exist for buyers of 
credits but a consolidation of CERs produced in South Africa could well lead to higher prices for 
CERs for producers. Such a fund would reduce the risks for buyers from Annex 1 countries 
compared to purchasing from individual projects as well as reduce the transaction costs for the 
individual project, as they would no longer have to find a buyer for the CERs and negotiate a 
purchase agreement with them. A price guideline for CERs could be publicised by the fund in order 
to act as a guideline for bidders under the CDM pilot project scheme. There should, however, be a 
sliding scale according to the benefits of the project for local communities and its contribution to 
sustainability. A premium could be paid for projects following the Gold Standard for example. 
 
Eskom could manage such a fund and be allowed to take a transaction fee for doing this in order 
that the utility receives an additional benefit from financing the CDM activities. The fund could also 
include investors from Annex 1 countries such as Danida or private companies in Annex 1 countries 
that have carbon emission targets. This would assist in financing CDM projects under the pilot 
project scheme. The sale of CERs through the carbon fund should also include CDM activities 
outside of the pilot project scheme as this will increase the number of CERs that can be offered 
through the fund as well as help create an enabling environment for CDM projects in South Africa. 
 
Once the CDM activities have been instigated monitoring of the impact of the project on the host 
industry in the form of energy savings, increased productivity and unexpected problems with the 
new technology should be provided to the DME in order that the project be assessed for its 
appropriateness for widespread use in relevant sectors and whether this should be done through 
 91
voluntary agreements or regulation. In this way the CDM becomes an integral tool in the planning 
process by providing planners with a tool that can be used to indicate the effects of the introduction 
of standards and regulation for EE on the affected sector.   
 
The CDM can be used by the state in this manner in order to prepare better EE strategies that are 
derived using precedence from local experiences. This approach may also help in allaying the fears 
of stakeholders of the risks and expenses involved in introducing new EE standards into the 
electricity system, as documentation will be available detailing the results of using cleaner 
technology. The use of CDM activities as pilot projects for determining EE policy can act as an 
indicator to stakeholders of the direction the government wishes to move a given sector in with 
regards to EE. This may result in stakeholders seizing the initiative and implementing EE initiatives 
of their own accord without the need for regulation.  
 
Summary 
A CDM pilot project scheme should be developed by the DME in order to integrate the experiences 
gained from CDM activities into government policy on EE. Such a scheme would not only reward 
participants by putting them in a situation whereby they are more efficient than competitors but are 
also likely to comply with future regulatory requirements. The creation of such a scheme would 
assist the government in charting the course that the EE strategy should take using the experiences 
from the pilot projects as a guideline. The creation of a South African carbon fund for the selling of 
CERs to Annex 1 buyers could also help in creating a stable South African market for CDM 
activities to function in. This should include CDM activities undertaken independently of the CDM 
pilot project scheme.  
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Conclusion 
The aim of this project was to answer the problem statement  
 
 
 
How can the CDM be integrated into energy planning in South Africa in order to assist 
government achieve its policy targets for energy efficiency? 
 
The CDM can be used in energy planning by utilising CDM activities as pilot projects to act as 
guidelines for the implementation of new policy initiatives. The CDM in itself does not have the 
ability to fulfil policy goals due to the additionality requirements in the CDM project cycle as well 
as the fact that the CDM is unlikely to attract the magnitude of investments needed to implement 
policies of the magnitude of the EE strategy. Despite this it appears that the CDM has created a 
feeling of complacency in government with regards to taking the necessary steps in implementing 
regulation and standards as well as taking initiatives on instigating an EE strategy in South Africa. 
This is problematic for achieving the policy targets of the DME as this approach will result in South 
Africa neither gaining from the benefits the CDM has to offer nor the advantages of increasing EE 
in the electricity sector. 
 
The proposed CDM pilot project scheme would allow the government to utilise the CDM in such a 
way that it could act as a guideline for future improvements in EE and provide experience with new 
and cleaner technologies with the aim of creating new regulation and standards for the relevant 
sectors. Such a CDM pilot scheme could be used for other policy targets such as the introduction of 
renewables and improvement in housing standards. The greatest hurdles facing the introduction of 
such a scheme are the lack of innovative thinking in government with regards to the electricity 
system and the conservative nature of Eskom as an organisation. Both these issues are reflected in 
planning documents such as the NIRP and the IEP, which are testaments to maintaining the status 
quo, as well as Eskom’s efforts to maintain its monopoly rather than compete in a free market. 
 
Better leadership from the government is required through policy and action. Experiences gained 
from the CDM pilot project scheme could be used as a guideline in developing policy and showing 
the intent of government to carry through policy that it has developed for the electricity sector but it 
requires a more proactive approach and a braver stance on issues such as EE rather than using the 
CDM as reasoning for not initiating policies. The introduction of a CDM pilot project scheme 
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would require the DME to take control of the process and introduce regulation and standards for EE 
in South Africa as well as create an enabling environment for such a CDM pilot scheme to function 
in. It is unlikely that the DME would be willing to do this despite the fact that the human capacity in 
the organisation is approaching the stage where such a scheme could be implemented. It is also 
questionable whether the energy section of the DME has the political influence to promote and 
implement such an undertaking.  
 
The government should establish a South African carbon fund under Eskom. The fund should 
function along the same lines as the DSM fund that currently exists but it should also allow foreign 
investors to place capital in the fund with the intention of recuperating the original investment in the 
form of CERs. Local investors could also be involved with the hope of benefiting financially from 
sales of CERs to Annex 1 countries. A carbon fund may well create a more conducive for investing 
in CDM activities in South Africa and lead to an increase in the number of projects developed.   
 
The targets derived by the DME for EE are realistic as is the EE strategy but an over reliance on 
foreign funding through the CDM and donor grants is not only unfounded but also unrealistic. The 
opportunity exists in South Africa to carry out extensive improvements in EE but greater 
responsibility must be given to the major stakeholders in the electricity sector and industry to carry 
out the EE strategy if it is to be a success. Eskom in particular should play a major role in 
implementing the EE strategy, as it is one of the main benefactors as well as being a state-owned 
monopoly. A new tariff system should be introduced in order to provide utilities with more 
incentive to introduce EE initiatives to consumers. This could be achieved replacing the RoR 
system with incentive-based tariff structures. A revenue cap tariff structure should be used, however 
a price range per unit should be stipulated in order that the new tariff system does not lead to 
unreasonable price increases.  
 
The benefit for South Africa of having a well-run state utility in implementing the EE strategy for 
the public benefit should not be underestimated. The absence of competition in the electricity 
market gives the government the opportunity to carry out public benefit projects such as the EE 
strategy hand in hand with Eskom, which will most likely lead to greater success in this endeavour. 
The introduction of competition to Eskom will not necessarily improve the South African electricity 
sector as effective regulation and governance can do this. The status of South Africa as a 
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developing country, the low electricity prices and large percentage of low-income households as 
well as plans for Eskom to maintain control over most of the generating capacity does not 
necessarily provide the economic grounding for private investors to enter the electricity market on 
an equal footing. The major driver for allowing competition in the electricity sector is to create 
opportunities for BEE. This could be done through joint ventures with Eskom rather than creating 
small entities in competition with a single major player with whom they cannot compete under free 
market principles.  
 
The trend in South Africa to use the CDM as an excuse for inaction on issues such as EE is a 
concern that should be addressed when considering how to utilise the flexible mechanisms in future 
international climate change policy. The incentives provided for non-Annex 1 countries not to 
implement policy due to the interpretation of additionality is a hindrance in affecting real reductions 
of GHGs in the developing world. The approval of sector-based CDM projects by the EB may have 
the potential to overcome this problem, but it does not appear that the EB has the mandate to take 
this decision and it may be necessary to refer the issue to the MOP. It is uncertain whether a 
solution will be found to this issue during the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. A 
sector-based approach may also assist more CDM projects involving EE become viable, as it will 
assist in overcoming the problems many EE projects face with regards to monitoring GHG 
reductions. This again is a difficult issue as the CDM is designed as a project-based mechanism but 
this issue should be kept in mind in negotiations for a second commitment period for GHG 
reductions.  
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